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Abstract
We embed financial frictions and sector-specific minimum investment require-
ments (MIR) in a two-factor, two-sector, overlapping-generation model and show
that whether trade integration leads to convergence of the income levels among
member states depends on their level of financial development. It helps reconcile
the mixed empirical evidence on trade integration and income dynamics in different
groups of countries from the institutional perspective.
In the recent decades, trade globalization has allowed developed countries to
specialize towards the high-MIR, high-return production stages and tasks through
international fragmentation of production and global sourcing. In our model, the
“sectors” can be interpreted broadly as production stages and tasks. Free trade may
induce the more financially developed countries to specialize fully in the high-MIR,
high-return “sector”, which fundamentally changes the credit market condition and
the way the interest rate is determined. In this case, free trade may amplify rather
than eliminate the global imbalances (a phenomenon of the large capital flows from
developing to developed countries observed in the recent years), opposite to the
findings of Antras and Caballero (2009, Journal of Political Economy). This way,
we argue that trade and financial integration should be analyzed jointly and trade-
driven structural changes may reshape our understanding of capital flows.
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1 Introduction
Regional trade agreements have gained momentum since the 1990s. The average member
of the World Trade Organization had agreements with more than 15 countries in 2010,
while this number was just 2 in 1990 (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). The cumulative number
of regional trade agreements in force rose from below 30 in 1990 to above 260 in 2014. This
trend does not seem to end soon. Whether these agreements lead to convergence of the
living standards among member states is a popular issue for economists and policymakers.
The empirical evidence is rather mixed. Ben-David (1993) finds substantial income
convergence within the European Economic Community during the postwar period of
trade reform. Ben-David (1996) focuses on groups of countries comprising major trade
partners and finds that the majority of these trade-based groups exhibited significant
convergence. Sachs and Warner (1995) also find convergence among countries that are
open to trade. In contrast, Slaughter (2001) uses the difference-in-difference method and
finds no strong, systematic link between trade liberalization and convergence. At the
regional level, Karras (1997) provides evidence that convergence in income per capita
has been the strongest and most rapid in the European Union, milder but probably
present in Latin American Free Trade Area, and non-existent in Association of Southeast
Asian Nations. Using standard growth models for nearly 100 developing countries over
1970-2004, te Velde (2011) finds that the level of intra-regional trade does not explain
changes in income disparities. Hammouda, Karingi, Njuguna, and Jallab (2009) present
evidence that there has been little progress in income convergence in Africa, despite
the existence of many region integration agreements. Venables (2003) argues that, if
comparative advantage is associated with per-capita income (via physical and human
capital endowment), North-North trade agreements may lead to convergence of the income
levels among member states, while South-South agreements tend to lead to divergence.
We propose that the mixed empirical evidence may be reconciled from the perspective
of financial development. Financial frictions and the sector-specific minimum investment
requirements (hereafter MIR) are embedded into a standard 2X2 (two-factor, two-sector),
overlapping-generation model in which firms hire capital and labor to produce two ho-
mogeneous goods. The two goods are then used for consumption and investment in the
Cobb-Douglas aggregator. We show that trade integration leads to convergence (diver-
gence) of the income levels among member states if they have the high (low) level of
financial development. In the real world, the developed (developing) countries usually
have the high (low) level of financial development. Thus, our model has the similar
predictions as Venables (2003), while the mechanism is different in the two models.
The intuition is as follows. For simplicity, we assume that the two sectors are symmet-
ric in every other respect except that the individual investment is subject to a positive
MIR in one sector. We call this sector the MIR sector. In the absence of financial frictions,
domestic savings are allocated efficiently in the two sectors so that the relative sectoral
price is constant at unity, regardless of the cross-country initial income dispersion. In this
case, trade integration has no impact on the income dynamics of individual countries.
In the presence of financial frictions, those agents with sufficiently high net wealth can
invest in the MIR sector, while other agents can only invest in the other sector and lend in
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the credit market. If financial frictions are sufficiently severe, the mass of investors in the
MIR sector is inefficiently low and so are the sectoral investment and output. Thus, the
output price is higher in the MIR sector than in the other sector. The severer the financial
frictions, the larger the investment distortions, the larger the sectoral price differential.
Suppose that the world economy consists of a continuum of countries which are inher-
ently identical except for the initial income level. The higher the aggregate income, the
higher the individual net wealth, the larger the mass of agents who can meet the MIR,
the smaller the sectoral investment distortions and the sectoral price differential. This
way, the extensive margin of sectoral investment1 becomes the key channel through which
aggregate income is a determinant of comparative advantage. To be specific, the initially
rich countries have the comparative advantage in the MIR sector.
Under autarky, the world economy may have a symmetric, unique steady state where
all countries converge to the same income level, regardless of the cross-country initial
income dispersion. Upon trade integration, the rich countries specialize towards the MIR
sector, while the poor countries specialize towards the other sector. The terms-of-trade
effect improves the allocation efficiency in all countries. Meanwhile, given the sectoral
price differential, the rich (poor) countries benefit (lose) from specializing towards the
high-price (low-price) sector. For the rich countries, the specialization effect reinforces
the terms-of-trade effect so that aggregate income is higher than under autarky; for the
poor countries, the specialization effect competes against the terms-of-trade effect and
the net effect on aggregate income depends on the size of the sectoral price differential.
If the integrated countries are financially developed, the sectoral price differential
is small and so is the specialization effect. The terms-of-trade effect dominates so that
aggregate income in the poor countries is also higher than under autarky. Then, given the
neoclassical production functions at the sectoral and at the aggregate levels, the decreasing
marginal revenue of capital (hereafter MRK) acts as a convergence force, driving all
countries towards the same steady state as under autarky. In this case, trade integration
accelerates convergence of the income levels among member states.
If the integrated countries are financially underdeveloped, the sectoral price differential
is large and so is the specialization effect. The terms-of-trade effect is dominated so that
aggregate income in the poor countries is lower than under autarky. In particular, if the
level of financial development in the integrated countries is sufficiently low, the sectoral
price differential is so large that the specialization effect also dominates the decreasing
MRK effect. As a result, the rich countries become richer and the poor countries poorer,
which further strengthens their respective comparative advantage over time. In this case,
specialization becomes a dynamic, self-reinforcing mechanism through which the trade
integration widens cross-country differences in initial income and eventually “breaks” the
symmetric, autarkic steady state of the world economy. As a result, inherently identical
countries are endogenously separated into two groups with different income levels.
In our model, trade integration may lead to endogenous income divergence among
inherently identical countries. In the real world, countries differ in many other aspects,
e.g., economic, social, and political institutions as well as natural endowments. Our
1In each sector, the total investment depends on the investment size of individual investors (the
intensive margin) as well as the mass of investors (the extensive margin).
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model offers an amplification mechanism through which small exogenous heterogeneities
may lead to large heterogeneities in endogenous variables.2
Next, we introduce the cross-country heterogeneity in financial development in this
model and analyze the implications of free trade on the global imbalances, i.e., a phe-
nomenon of the large capital flows from developing to developed countries in the recent
years (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2006, 2007). Antras and Caballero (2009, JPE)
prove that, if the global imbalances are an equilibrium response to heterogeneous degrees
of financial development across the world, free trade can reverse the direction of capital
flows and eliminate this phenomenon. We prove that their findings critically depend on
the assumption that the mass of investor in each sector and the leverage ratio are ex-
ogenous. In equilibrium, free trade only triggers the cross-sector reallocation of labor,
leading to partial specialization in each country. Then, the interest rate is always coupled
with the MRK in the unconstrained sector, which is key to their results.
In our model, the mass of investors in each sector and the leverage ratio are endoge-
nous. Free trade triggers the cross-sector reallocation of labor and investment so that the
more financially developed countries may specialize fully in the constrained sector and the
interest rate is decoupled from the MRK in the unconstrained sector. In this case, moving
from autarky to free trade may widen rather than reverse the cross-country interest rate
differential so that the global imbalances are amplified rather than eliminated.
In the recent decades, trade liberalization has induced developed countries to spe-
cialize towards the high-MIR, high-return production stages and tasks through global
sourcing and international fragmentation of production (Alfaro, Antras, Chor, and Con-
coni, 2015; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, and
de Vries, 2014). We provide an example that trade-drive structural changes may have
fundamentally change some conventional wisdoms on international capital flows.
The main message is that, although free trade helps ameliorate the global imbalances
under certain conditions, the ultimate solution to this phenomenon is to improve the
financial sectors in developing countries.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to the theoretical literature on trade and income divergence. Ba-
jona and Kehoe (2010) identify the elasticity of substitution between traded goods as a
key determinant of whether trade leads to income convergence among inherently iden-
tical countries. Matsuyama (1996, 2013) focuses on sector-specific factor intensity and
shows that, in the model of increasing returns (Krugman, 1979), commodity trade causes
agglomeration of different economic activities in different regions of the world, leading
to income divergence. Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) show that the income dynamics of a
poor country depend on its initial position relative to the rest of world’s diversification
2Matsuyama (2004) was the first to discover this symmetry-breaking mechanism in the context of
financial integration. By introducing wealth inequality and the MIR into Matsuyama’s framework, Zhang
(2015) shows that, besides financial development, wealth inequality also affects the consequences of
financial integration. The current paper extends the model of Zhang (2015) into a two-sector setting and
analyzes the consequences of trade integration as well as its implications on the global imbalances.
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cone. Cunat and Maffezzoli (2004) show that, if the initial cross-country dispersion in
the capital-labor ratio is sufficiently large, trade leads to full specialization and, conver-
gence in growth rates obtains without implying absolute convergence in income levels. If
these models are used to justify the mixed empirical evidence of trade integration, one
needs to assume that different country groups have different preferences or technologies,
or dispersions of initial conditions.
We propose the level of financial development as a determinant of the consequence
of trade integration and hence, the mixed empirical evidence might be reconciled from
the institutional perspective. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) were the first to show that
better access to capital becomes a source of comparative advantage. It was then fol-
lowed by a strand of theoretical literature on financial development and international
trade (Antras and Caballero, 2009; Beck, 2002; Chesnokova, 2007; Ju and Wei, 2005).3
Matsuyama (2005) introduces sector-specific borrowing constraints in a static model and
shows that trade allows the rich (poor) country to fully specialize in the sector with tighter
(looser) borrowing constraints. Wynne (2005) argues that a country’s wealth can be a
determinant of comparative advantage when access to credit differs across sectors, i.e.,
wealthier nations exhibit a comprehensive advantage towards goods produced in sectors
facing more severe financial frictions. Ju and Wei (2011) point out that, in the countries
with low-quality institutions, the quality of financial system is an independent source of
comparative advantage. Our paper extends this literature and analyzes the joint deter-
mination of trade and capital flows. Jin (2012) integrates factor-proportions-based trade
and financial capital flows in an OLG model and shows that capital tends to flow to coun-
tries that become more specialized in capital-intensive industries. Ju, Shi, and Wei (2014)
introduce two tradeable sectors with different factor intensity in a small open economy
model and show that the current account adjustment to exogenous shocks depends on
factor market flexibility. Instead of assuming the sector-specific factor intensity, we focus
on a real friction, i.e., the sector-specific MIR, in addition to financial frictions.
In the literature, the MIR is used to capture the investment indivisibility at the
individual level, which is a important feature of business ideas, physical and human
capital (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee and Moll, 2010; Banerjee and Newman, 1993;
Galor and Zeira, 1993; Piketty, 1997). Recently, Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2008),
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Manova (2013), and
Midrigan and Xu (2014) introduce the fixed cost or the entry cost at the firm level
and show that the individual investment is above a minimum scale in equilibrium. In
our model, assuming the MIR rather than the fixed cost allows us to characterize the
3Recently, a booming literature has documented the extensive empirical evidence on the relationship
between financial development and trade patterns. Financially developed countries export more in sectors
that require more external finance and in sectors with fewer tangible assets (Beck, 2003; Hur, Raj, and
Riyanto, 2006; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005). Manova (2008) shows that equity market liberalization
increases exports disproportionately more in sectors that require more external funds or employ fewer
collateralizable assets. Manova (2013) further decompose the trade effect of weak financial markets and
show that financially developed countries serve more destination markets and export more products, in
more financially vulnerable sectors. Chor and Manova (2012) analyze the collapse of international trade
flows during the global financial crisis and show that credit conditions were an important channel through
which the financial crisis affected trade volumes.
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dynamic properties in the entire parameter spaces.
We also revisit the factor price equalization (hereafter FPE) theorem in the presence
of financial and real frictions. In our model, if trade integration induces the rich countries
to specialize fully in the MIR sector, FPE does not hold. Deardorff (2001) shows that free
trade leads to FPE if countries stay in the same cone of diversification. In the dynamic
model, the multi-cone equilibrium may arise and FPE holds within cones, but not between
them. The lack of FPE in our model can also be interpreted in Deardorff’s framework. In
Antras and Caballero (2009), although trade alone does not lead to FPE, allowing both
trade and capital flows can do. In our mode, if free trade leads to full specialization,
adding capital mobility in the free-trade equilibrium may not achieve FPE, either. This
is a standard result of the second-best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and
analyzes the autarkic equilibria. Section 3 shows that trade integration may lead to
income convergence or divergences among inherently identical countries, depending on
their level of financial development. Section 4 revisits the findings of Antras and Caballero
(2009) in a two-country version of our model. Section 5 discusses our results under
alternative assumptions. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications. Technical
proofs are available in the appendix.
2 The Model under International Autarky
The world economy consists of a continuum of countries, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Countries
are inherently identical except for the initial income level. In each country, a continuum of
agents indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] are born every period and live for two periods, young and old;
agent j is endowed with lj = (1−θ)j units of labor when young and it consumes only when
old, where j ∈ [1,∞) follows the Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution
function G(j) = 1 − −
1
θ
j and θ ∈ (0, 1).4 The population size of each generation is
constant at one. In equilibrium, agents supply their labor endowment inelastically and
the aggregate labor supply is constant at L =
∫∞
1
(1− θ)jdG(j) = 1.
In country i, there are two final good sectors, A and B. In period t, sector f employs
Ki,ft units of physical capital and L
i,f
t units of labor to produce Y
i,f
t units of final good
f , where f ∈ {A,B}. Physical capital fully depreciates after the production. Then, V i,At
units of final good A and V i,Bt units of final good B are used as the inputs to produce Y
i
t
units of composite goods.5 The composite good is taken as the numeraire. Old agents
4The inverse of θ is the tail index of the Pareto distribution. The larger the θ, the more dispersed
the labor endowment distribution. Pareto distribution has been widely used to feature the income
and wealth distribution in the literature. In particular, the top tail of the income distribution is very
well approximated by a Pareto distribution. Besides, assuming the Pareto distribution for the labor
endowment allows us to obtain the analytical solutions. Our qualitative results still hold under other
forms of distribution, e.g., the uniform distribution for labor endowment, e.g., lj ∈ [1− a, 1 + a] with the
probability density function 12a , although the analysis becomes much more complicated.
5Under autarky, the market for good f clears domestically, V i,ft = Y
i,f
t . However, under free trade,
the domestic absorption of final good f can be different from its domestic output, V i,ft 6= Y i,ft .
Antras and Caballero (2009) assume that physical capital and labor are used to produce two final goods
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consume Cit units of composite goods, while young agents invest M
i,f
t units of composite
goods in period t to produce Ki,ft+1 = RM
i,f
t units of physical capital, which is sector-
specific and becomes available in period t + 1. Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors
and wit denotes the wage rate. Composite and final goods are internationally tradeable,
while physical capital and labor are not. Markets for goods and productive factors are
competitive so that the inputs are rewarded at their marginal revenues. Let pi,ft and q
i,f
t
denote the price of final good and the MRK in sector f . To sum up,
Y i,ft =
(
Ki,ft
α
)α(
Li,ft
1− α
)1−α
, qi,ft K
i,f
t = αp
i,f
t Y
i,f
t , w
i
tL
i,f
t = (1− α)pi,ft Y i,ft , (1)
Y it =
(
V i,At
η
)η(
V i,Bt
1− η
)1−η
, pi,At V
i,A
t = ηY
i
t , p
i,B
t V
i,B
t = (1− η)Y it , (2)
where α, η ∈ (0, 1). There is no uncertainty in the model economy. The two sectors are
symmetric except for the MIR to be described later.
In this section, we analyze the economic allocation under autarky where international
trade and financial capital flows are not allowed. The final goods markets clear domesti-
cally and domestic investment is financed by domestic savings,
V i,ft = Y
i,f
t and M
i,A
t +M
i,B
t = w
i
tL. (3)
Let χit ≡ p
i,B
t
pi,At
and µit ≡ q
i,B
t
qi,At
denote the relative sectoral price and MRK, respectively.
Combine the sectoral investment function Ki,ft+1 = RM
i,f
t with (1)-(3) to get the sectoral
demand for investment in period-t and the sectoral demand for labor in period t+ 1,
M i,At =
ηwitLµ
i
t+1
1− η(1− µit+1)
and M i,Bt =
(1− η)witL
1− η(1− µit+1)
, (4)
Li,At+1 = ηL and L
i,B
t+1 = (1− η)L. (5)
Since the aggregate labor supply is constant at unity L = 1, we drop L for notational
simplicity. Due to the frictionless labor market and the perfect cross-sector labor mobility,
the wage rate equalizes the marginal revenue of labor (hereafter MRL) in two sectors.
According to equations (5), labor is efficiently allocated in the two sectors, proportional
to the sectoral share in the production function of composite goods.
Were the sectoral investment also frictionless, savings would be allocated in the two
sectors in the same way as labor. In the next period, the sectoral prices would be equalized
and so would the sectoral MRKs, χit+1 = µ
i
t+1 = 1. See equations (4).
However, the individual investment is subject to financial frictions and the sector-
specific MIR. Consider agent j born in country i and period t. If it invests mi,Bj,t units of
which can be consumed or invested into physical capital, according to the Cobb-Douglas aggregator. As
a result, agents devote a fraction η of their spending to one good and the rest to the other. Alternatively,
one can introduce a composite good as a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of two final goods, which is then used
for consumption and investment (Ju and Wei, 2011). In appendix B, we prove that the two approaches
are analytically equivalent and the second one significantly simplifies our analysis, given that our model
features the endogenous sectoral adjustment on the extensive margin.
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composite goods in sector B and period t, it gets ki,Bj,t+1 = Rm
i,B
j,t units of physical capital
in period t+ 1. Its investment in sector A yields the same linear output ki,Aj,t+1 = Rm
i,A
j,t , if
its investment size is no less than a minimum value, mi,Aj,t ≥ m; otherwise, its investment
output is zero. Figure 1 shows the sectoral investment functions at the individual level.
mi,Bj,t
ki,Bj,t+1
O
Rmi,Bj,t
Individual Investment in Sector B
mi,Aj,t
ki,Aj,t+1
O m
Rmi,Aj,t
Individual Investment in Sector A
Figure 1: Sector-Specific Investment Function
The agent can save its labor income nij,t = w
i
tlj in three ways: (1) lending to the credit
market for the interest rate rit, (2) investing in sector B for the rate of return q
i,B
t+1R,
and (3) investing in sector A for the rate of return qi,At+1R if it can meet the MIR. Since
everyone has the equal access to the first two options and both final goods are produced
domestically under autarky, the interest rate is coupled with the rate of return in sector
B,6 rit = q
i,B
t+1R. Besides, the interest rate cannot exceed the rate of return in sector A,
rit ≤ qi,At+1R; otherwise, no one would invest in sector A. To sum up,
rit =q
i,B
t+1R ≤ qi,At+1R. (6)
Let us start with the case of rit < q
i,A
t+1R. According to (6), q
i,B
t+1R < q
i,A
t+1R. If the agent
can meet the MIR, it prefers to invest its entire labor income in sector A and borrow as
much as possible to finance its investment mi,Aj,t . Due to limited commitment, the agent
can only borrow up to a fraction λ of its investment return in the present value,
bij,t ≤ λ
qi,At+1Rm
i,A
j,t
rit
, (7)
and use its labor income as equity capital to cover the gap mi,Aj,t − bij,t = nij,t, where
λ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the level of financial development.7 In period t + 1, the agent gets the
6Under free trade, a country may specialize fully in sector A and M i,Bt = 0 implies the decoupling the
interest rate from the rate of return in sector B, rit > q
i,B
t+1R. See subsection 4.2.1 for details.
7Matsuyama (2004) shows that the strategic default a la` Hart and Moore (1994) can give rise to this
form of the borrowing constraints. Under autarky, rit = q
i,B
t+1R implies that those who invest in sector B
do not have the incentive to borrow. Thus, the borrowing constraints are slack in sector B.
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investment return, qi,At+1Rm
i,A
j,t , repays the debt, r
i
tb
i
j,t, and consumes the rest. The positive
spread qi,At+1R−rit > 0 induces the agent to borrow to the limit. Define the agent’s leverage
ratio in sector A as ψij,t ≡
mi,Aj,t −bij,t
mi,Aj,t
and define its equity rate as the rate of return to equity
capital, Ωij,t ≡
qi,At+1Rm
i,A
j,t −ritbij,t
mi,Aj,t −bij,t
. Use the binding borrowing constraint to get,
ψij,t = ψ
i
t ≡ 1− λ
qi,At+1R
rit
(8)
Ωij,t = Ω
i
t =q
i,A
t+1R + (q
i,A
t+1R− rit)(
1
ψit
− 1), (9)
mi,Aj,t =
nij,t
ψit
=
wit
ψit
(1− θ)j. (10)
The individual investment size is linear in the agent’s net wealth, while the leverage ratio
and the equity rate are common for all agents who can invest in sector A.
There exists a cutoff value it. The agents with j ≥ it can meet the MIR and are
called entrepreneurs. Their total mass is τ it = (
i
t)
− 1
θ . it is associated with those who just
meet the MIR at the margin,
wit
ψit
(1− θ)it = m, ⇒ it =
ψitF
wit
, where F ≡ m
1− θ .
Besides, the constant population size in each generation imposes a natural limit on the
mass of entrepreneurs, i.e., τ it ≤ 1. Thus, the cutoff value is
it = max
{
1,
ψitF
wit
}
. (11)
When young, entrepreneurs finance their investment in sector A with the labor income,
nij,t, and loan b
i
j,t = n
i
j,t(
1
ψit
−1); when old, they consume ci,ej,t+1 and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,e
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tΩ
i
t. (12)
The agents with j ∈ [1, it) cannot meet the MIR and are called households. Their total
mass is 1 − τ it = 1 − (it)−
1
θ . When young, households invest mi,Bj,t in sector B and lend
out the rest nij,t −mi,Bj,t ; when old, they consume, ci,hj,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,h
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tr
i
t. (13)
Let Dit and S
i
t denote the aggregate credit demand and supply, respectively. Let M
i,f
t
denote the total investment in sector f ∈ {A,B}. The markets for credit, sector-specific
capital, composite and final goods, and labor clear,
Dit ≡
∫ ∞
it
(mi,Aj,t − nij,t)dG(j), Sit ≡
∫ it
1
(nij,t −mi,Bj,t )dG(j), Dit = Sit , (14)
Ki,At+1 =
∫ ∞
it
Rmi,Aj,t dG(j) = RM
i,A
t , K
i,B
t+1 =
∫ it
1
Rmi,Bj,t dG(j) = RM
i,B
t , (15)
Cit ≡
∫ ∞
it
ci,ej,tdG(j) +
∫ it
1
ci,hj,tdG(j), C
i
t +M
i,B
t +M
i,B
t = Y
i
t , (16)
V i,At = Y
i,A
t , V
i,B
t = Y
i,B
t , L
i,A
t + L
i,B
t = L = 1. (17)
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If rit = q
i,A
t+1R, the borrowing constraints are slack and the agents who can meet the
MIR has no incentive to invest their entire labor income in sector A or borrow to the
limit. Despite the indeterminacy at the individual level, a fraction η of aggregate saving
and labor are efficiently allocated in sector A and the rest in sector B.
Definition 1. Under autarky, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of individual
choices {nij,t,mi,fj,t , ci,ej,t, ci,hj,t , ψij,t}, the cutoff value {it}, the prices {pi,ft , qi,ft , wit, rit,Ωit}, and
the aggregate quantities {Y it , Y i,ft , Ki,ft ,M i,ft , Li,ft , V i,ft }, satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6),
(8)-(17), where f ∈ {A,B}.
According to equations (1)-(4), domestic investment is financed by domestic saving
in period t, M i,At + M
i,B
t = w
i
t, and the aggregate investment return in period t + 1 is∑
f∈{A,B} q
i,f
t+1K
i,f
t+1 = ρw
i
t+1, where ρ ≡ α1−α . The social rate of return is defined as
Υit ≡
∑
f∈{A,B} q
i,f
t+1K
i,f
t+1∑
f∈{A,B}M
i,f
t
=
ηµit+1
1− η + ηµit+1
qi,At+1R +
1− η
1− η + ηµit+1
qi,Bt+1R = ρ
wit+1
wit
. (18)
2.1 Equilibrium Allocation under Autarky
We suppress the country index i for the scenario of autarky. Given the constant aggregate
labor input L = 1 and the Cobb-Douglas production functions, the wage rate is propor-
tional to aggregate income, wt = (1 − α)Yt. We can use the law of motion for wage to
analyze the dynamics of aggregate income as well as the model properties.
Financial frictions and the sector-specific MIR may distort the sectoral investment in
the sense that aggregate saving is allocated inefficiently less (more) to sector A (B). In this
case, the rate of return in sector A (B) is higher (lower) than the social rate of return and
so is the equity rate (the interest rate), i.e., Ωt > q
A
t+1R > Υt > q
B
t+1R = rt and µt+1 < 1;
the borrowing constraints are binding and the aggregate dynamics are characterized by
{wt, ψt, t, µt+1,Γt,Υt, rt, χt+1} satisfying equations (11), (18)-(22),8
ψt = 1− λ
µt+1
, (19)

− 1−θ
θ
t =
ηµt+1
1− η(1− µt+1)ψt, (20)
wt+1 =
(
R
ρ
Γtwt
)α
, where Γt ≡ µ
η
t+1
1− η(1− µt+1) < 1, and
∂Γt
∂µt+1
> 0, (21)
rt = Υt[1− η(1− µt+1)] < Υt, χt+1 = µαt+1. (22)
Given the aggregate saving wt, the larger the investment distortions, the lower the
relative sectoral capital kt+1 ≡ K
A
t+1
KBt+1
=
RMAt
RMBt
= η
1−ηµt+1, the lower the relative sectoral rate
of return µt+1 ≡ q
B
t+1R
qAt+1R
and the relative sectoral output yt+1 ≡ Y
A
t+1
Y Bt+1
= η
1−ηχt+1 =
η
1−ηµ
α
t+1,
the lower the aggregate output Yt+1. Thus, µt+1 reflects the cross-sector investment
efficiency and Γt measures the aggregate allocation efficiency,
∂Γt
∂µt+1
> 0.
8See the proofs for lemma 1, 5, and proposition 1 in the appendix for derivation.
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If the sectoral investment is efficient, the dynamics of aggregate income are charac-
terized by equation (21) with µt+1 = χt+1 = Γt = 1; t and ψt are jointly determined by
(11) and (20); the private and the social rates of return equalize, rt = Ωt = Υt = q
A
t+1R =
qBt+1R, so that the borrowing constraints are slack with ψt > 1− λ.9
Lemma 1 specifies the condition for allocation efficiency.
Lemma 1. Let Y¯A ≡ m(1−λ)
1
1−θ η
θ
1−θ
(1−α)(1−θ) . For Yt ≥ Y¯A, the sectoral investment is efficient,
µt+1 = 1. For Yt ∈ (0, Y¯A), the sectoral investment is inefficient, µt+1 ∈ (λ, 1), where
∂µt+1
∂λ
> 0, ∂µt+1
∂m
< 0, and ∂µt+1
∂Yt
> 0.
For Yt ∈ (0, Y¯A), the cross-sector investment is inefficient and µt+1 is affected by three
factors. First, the lower the λ, the lower the agent’s borrowing capacity, the smaller the
individual investment in sector A, the higher the cutoff value t, the smaller (larger) the
mass of entrepreneurs (households) and the investment in sector A (B) on the extensive
margins, the larger the cross-sector investment distortions, the lower the µt+1. Second,
the larger the m, the higher the cutoff value t, the lower (higher) the total investment in
sector A (B) on the extensive margin, the lower the µt+1. Third, the lower the Yt, the
lower the individual labor income, the higher the cutoff value t, the lower (higher) the
total investment in sector A (B) on the extensive margin, the lower the µt+1.
2.1.1 Cross-Sector Investment Distortions and Aggregate Income Dynamics
We first analyze a benchmark setting with either no MIR (m = 0) or no financial frictions
(λ = 1). According to lemma 1, Y¯A = 0 so that the cross-sector investment is always
efficient, µt+1 = Γt = 1. According to equations (1)-(2), the sectoral and the aggregate
production functions are neoclassical and, due to the decreasing MRK, the law of motion
for wage is concave with a slope less than one at any steady state,
wt+1 =
(
R
ρ
wt
)α
,⇒ ∂wt+1
∂wt
|wt+1=wt= 1− (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing MRK effect
< 1, and ρ ≡ α
1− α. (23)
Intuitively, the decreasing MRK is a convergence force, driving country i towards a unique
steady state with the wage rate at wB =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
. Subscript B refers to the benchmark
setting. The smaller the α, the stronger the decreasing MRK, the faster the convergence
of aggregate income. We call it the decreasing MRK effect.
In the presence of both the MIR (m > 0) and financial frictions (λ < 1), Y¯A > 0.
The cross-sector investment is efficient for Yt ≥ Y¯A and a rise in aggregate income raises
the sectoral investment on the intensive margin. The cross-sector investment is inefficient
for Yt ∈ (0, Y¯A) and, besides the intensive-margin effect, a rise in aggregate income also
improves the cross-sector investment composition on the extensive margin, according to
lemma 1. On the intensive margin, the decreasing MRK effect is a convergence force; on
the extensive margin, the investment composition effect is a divergence force.
9As mentioned above, the zero spread rt = q
A
t+1R leads to the indeterminacy of the investment size
and the leverage ratio at the individual level. For analytical simplicity, we focus on an equilibrium where
all entrepreneurs still invest their entire labor income in sector A and choose the same ψt.
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Use equation (21) to get the slope of the law of motion for wage at any steady state,
∂wt+1
∂wt
|wt+1=wt = 1− (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing MRK effect
+ α
∂ ln Γt
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnwt︸ ︷︷ ︸
investment composition effect
= α +
αη(1− µt+1)
1+ η
1−ηλ
(1− λ
µt+1
)(1−θ) − 1
.
(24)
Let w¯A ≡ (1 − α)Y¯A. According to lemma 1, for wt ∈ (0, w¯A), µt+1 < 1. If there exists
a steady state where wt ∈ (0, w¯A), the investment composition effect is positive in this
steady state and, according to equation (24), its size depends on three factors. The
lower the λ, the larger the cross-sector investment distortion, the stronger the investment
composition effect; the lower the θ, the less dispersed the wealth distribution, the more
sensitive the mass of entrepreneurs and the sectoral investment to the change in aggregate
income, the stronger the investment composition effect; the higher the α, the weaker the
decreasing MRK, the stronger the investment composition effect. In a steady state, if the
investment composition effect dominates the decreasing MRK effect, the slope of the law
of motion for wage exceeds unity, implying the existence of multiple steady states.
2.1.2 Wealth Inequality, Financial Development, and Multiple Steady States
Proposition 1. Let θˆ ≡ 1
1+ 1
ηρ
< 1 and λˆA ≡
[
1√
(1−η)ηρ +
√
1
ηρ
+ 1
]−2
< 1.
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), there is a threshold value λA ≤ λˆA such that, for λ ∈ (0, λA), multiple
steady states may arise under autarky, where
∂λA
∂θ
< 0. Besides, ∂θˆ
∂α
> 0 and ∂λˆA
∂α
> 0.
O
1
1λ
θ
λA
θ
λA
U
M
^
^
__
Figure 2: Multiple Steady States under Autarky in the {λ, θ} Space
Figure 3 shows that multiple steady states may arise under autarky if the parameter
configuration of {λ, θ} is in region M. The rise in wealth inequality10 and/or the improve-
ment in financial development weaken the investment composition effect, which reduces
10In our model, the wealth distribution of young agents determines the sectoral investment and aggre-
gate production. Since the labor income is the only source of individual wealth and is linear in labor
endowment, the wealth distribution of young agents is also Pareto with the mean wt and the shape
parameter 1θ . The higher the θ, the more dispersed the labor endowment and the wealth of young agents.
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or even fully eliminates the possibility of multiple steady states.11 In the following, we
focus on the case of θ ∈ (0, θˆ) and explore the mechanism behind multiple steady states.
O 1
Z
Z
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M
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__
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Figure 3: Multiple Steady States under Autarky: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
Let Z ≡ R
ηρ
(
1−θ
m
) 1
ρ denotes a composite parameter. Define a threshold value,12
λ˜A ≡ 1− Zρ(1−θ)ηρ(1−θ)−θ. (25)
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), figure 3 shows that multiple steady states arise for the parameter
configuration {λ, Z} in region M. The curve between region US and UB shows λ˜A as a
function of Z. The dashed curves in figure 4 show the laws of motion for wage in the
benchmark setting and there exists a unique, stable steady state; the solid curves show
the laws of motion for wage, given the parameter configuration in the three regions of
figure 3, respectively. For wt ∈ (0, w¯A), the solid curve is below the dashed one and the
gap (1− Γαt )
(
R
ρ
wt
)α
measures the efficiency losses due to the investment distortions.
Let us start with region US of figure 3. Due to a high level of financial development
and/or a low MIR and/or a high productivity R, the investment distortions are small so
that the law of motion for wage only deviates slightly from the benchmark for wt ∈ (0, w¯A).
According to the left panel of figure 4, there is a unique, stable steady state. Given
λ > λ˜A, the borrowing constraints are s lack in the steady state where the wage rate is
the same as in the benchmark setting, wA = wB > w¯A. In this case, the investment
distortions only slow down the convergence, without affecting the steady state.
By reducing λ and/or Z, we move from region US to UB in figure 3. Compared
with the previous case, the larger financial frictions and/or a higher MIR and/or a lower
productivity lead to the larger investment distortions so that the law of motion for wage
deviates to a larger extent from the benchmark for wt ∈ (0, w¯A). According to the middle
panel of figure 4, there is still a unique, stable steady state. However, given λ < λ˜A, the
borrowing constraints are binding in the steady state where the wage rate is lower than
11If either θ > θˆ or λ > λˆA, there is a unique steady state in each country under autarky.
12For λ = λ˜A, the borrowing constraints are weakly binding at the steady state, µA = 1 and ψA = 1−λ.
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Figure 4: Laws of Motion for Wage under Autarky: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
in the benchmark setting, wA < wB. In this case, the investment distortions affect both
the convergence and the steady state.
Let us then consider region M where financial frictions are severe, λ ∈ (0, λA), and the
productivity R is high, Z > Z. For wt ∈ (0, w¯A), the investment distortions are so large
that the law of motion for wage deviates drastically from the benchmark and multiple
steady states arise. According to the right panel of figure 4, for an initial income below
(above) YM ≡ wM1−α , the country converges to steady state L (H) with wL < wM < wH .13
Essentially, the investment composition effect is key to the rise of multiple steady states.14
So far, we analyze the autarkic equilibria for an individual country. In the world
economy where countries are inherently identical, if the parameter configuration is in
region UB-US of figure 3, there is a unique, symmetric steady state under autarky where
all countries converge to the same income level, regardless of the cross-country initial
income dispersion. In the next section, we maintain the parameter configuration in region
UB-US of figure 3 and analyze whether this symmetric, autarkic steady state is still the
unique steady state in the world economy under trade integration. Let XA denote the
steady-state value of endogenous variable X under autarky.
3 Equilibrium Allocation under Trade Integration
In this section, we first explore the mechanism through which free trade can lead to
multiple steady states for a small open economy. Then, we identify the conditions under
which trade integration may “break” the symmetric, autarkic steady state of the world
economy and inherently identical countries converge to different income levels.
13If w¯A ≤ wB , the borrowing constraints are slack at steady state H where the wage rate is same as
the benchmark, wH = wB ; if w¯A > wB , the borrowing constraints are binding at steady state H where
the wage rate is below the benchmark, wH < wB .
14Besides setting either λ = 1 or m = 0, one can also shut down the investment composition effect by
setting η = 1. In this case, sector B vanishes and the two-sector model degenerates into a one-sector
model. Under autarky, aggregate saving wt is fully invested in sector A K
i,A
t+1 = Rwt and the law of
motion for wage is identical as in the benchmark setting. Then, there is a unique steady state.
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3.1 Multiple Steady States in the Small Open Economy
Suppose that the world relative sectoral price is constant at χ∗. Country i announces in
period 0 that agents can freely import and export final goods from period 1 on.15 Then,
the relative sectoral price in country i is aligned with the world level, χit = χ
∗ and so is
the relative sectoral MRK, µit = (χ
i
t)
1
α = (χ∗)
1
α = µ∗, where t = 1, 2, 3, ....
Let ς i,ft ≡ Y
i,f
t −V i,ft
V i,ft
denote the export-to-domestic-absorbtion ratio in sector f , with
the negative value for the case of imports. With no international capital flows, trade is
balanced every period, pi,At ς
i,A
t V
i,A
t + p
i,B
t ς
i,B
t V
i,B
t = 0. Combine it with equation (2),
χit
η
1− η =
V i,At
V i,Bt
= −χit
ς i,Bt
ς i,At
, ⇒ ς i,Bt = −
η
1− η ς
i,A
t . (26)
The sectoral demands for investment in period t and for labor in period t+ 1 are
M i,At =
η(1 + ς i,At+1)w
i
tµ
∗
1− η(1 + ς i,At+1)(1− µ∗)
and M i,Bt =
[1− η(1 + ς i,At+1)]wit
1− η(1 + ς i,At+1)(1− µ∗)
, (27)
Li,At+1 = η(1 + ς
i,A
t+1) and L
i,B
t+1 = 1− η(1 + ς i,At+1). (28)
Let wˆT ≡
(
1− λ
µ∗
) 1
1−θ
F. For wit ≥ wˆT , the mass of entrepreneurs is so high that the
aggregate credit demand pushes the interest rate above the rate of return in sector B.
Households lend out their entire labor income and do not invest in sector B. Thus, country
i specializes fully in sector A, i.e., M i,Bt = L
i,B
t+1 = 0 and ς
i,A
t+1 =
1
η
− 1. For wit ∈ (0, wˆT ),
the mass of entrepreneurs is so low that the total debt capacity of entrepreneurs is less
than the labor income of households. Besides lending in the credit market, households
also invest in sector B. Thus, both sectors are active in country i,16 i.e., M i,ft > 0 and
Li,ft+1 > 0, where f ∈ {A,B}. Accordingly, the export-to-domestic-absorption ratio is
ς i,At+1 =

1
η
{
1+µ∗
[(
wˆT
wt
) 1−θ
θ −1
]} − 1 ∈ (−1, 1
η
− 1), for wit < wˆT ;
1
η
− 1, for wit ≥ wˆT .
(29)
The law of motion for wage depends on whether country i fully specializes in sector A,
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
witΓ
i
t
)α
,
Γit =

(µ∗)η
1−η(1−µ∗)(1+ςi,At+1)
= (µ∗)η−1
[
µ∗ + (1− µ∗)
(
wit
wˆT
) 1−θ
θ
]
, for wit < wˆT ;
(µ∗)η−1, for wit ≥ wˆT .
(30)
15If the free trade policy is announced and implemented in the same period, the relative sectoral
price is aligned immediately with the world level, which unexpectedly affects the investment return of
the currently old agents and aggregate income. In the two-period OLG model, announcing free trade
one-period in advance avoids such an uncertainty.
16In the current setting, the labor endowment follows the Pareto distribution, j ∈ [1,∞), which has
no upper bound. There are always some agents who can meet the MIR so that sector A is always active
under free trade, M i,At > 0. In the previous version (Zhang, 2014), the labor endowment is distributed
with an upper bound. Under free trade, for a sufficiently low aggregate income, the wage rate is so low
that even the agent with the highest labor endowment cannot meet the MIR and country i specializes
fully in sector B, M i,At = 0. Our qualitative results hold in both settings.
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In the following, we assume χ∗ = χA17 and analyze how free trade may affect the
autarkic steady state in country i. Although the autarkic steady state is still a steady
state under free trade, it may not be stable or unique.
3.1.1 Aggregate Income as A Determinant of Comparative Advantage
Under autarky, for Y it ∈ (0, Y¯A), the sectoral investment is inefficient µit+1 < 1. The higher
the aggregate income in period t, the smaller the investment distortions, the higher the
relative sectoral output in period t+ 1
∂yit+1
∂Y it
> 0, the higher the relative sectoral price in
period t+ 1
∂χit+1
∂Y it
> 0, where yit ≡ Y
i,A
t
Y i,Bt
and χit ≡ p
i,B
t
pi,At+1
= (µit)
α.
For the parameter configuration in region UB of figure 3, µA < 1 and χA = µ
α
A < 1.
Lemma 2. Given χ∗ = χA < 1, country i has a comparative advantage in final good A
for Y it > YA and in final good B for Y
i
t < YA. In other words, the relatively rich (poor)
country has a comparative advantage in final good A (B).
3.1.2 Specialization as A Self-Reinforcing, Amplification Mechanism
Let us start with the parameter configuration in region US of figure 3. The cross-sector
investment in country i is efficient in the autarkic steady state, χA = 1. For the initial
income level at Y i0 < Y¯A, the cross-sector investment would be inefficient in period 0 and
the relative sectoral price would be χi1 < 1 under autarky. See the left panel of figure 4.
Thus, given χ∗ = χA = 1 from period 1 on, country i has the comparative advantage in
final good B. By aligning the relative sectoral price with the world level, free trade raises
(reduces) the MRL and the MRK in sector B (A) in period 1. The frictionless labor
market ensures the efficient labor reallocation towards sector B, which further amplifies
the changes in the MRK in both sectors. In period 0, the rate of return rises in sector B
and declines in sector A. Households invest more in sector B and lend less to the credit
market, leading to a rise in the interest rate. Due to the lower rate of return in sector
A and the higher interest rate, individual entrepreneurs reduce their investment and the
mass of entrepreneurs falls. Thus, besides the labor reallocation, free trade also triggers
the investment reallocation from sector A to B on the intensive and extensive margins.
Free trade improves the terms-of-trade and raises allocation efficiency in country i.
Given χ∗ = 1, the sectoral price differential vanishes, χit+1 = χ
∗ = 1 so that the sectoral
rates of return are equalized, µit+1 = (χ
i
t+1)
1
α = 1 and aggregate allocation becomes
efficient Γit = 1. In other words, the terms-of-trade effect is so strong that free trade
allows country i to fully “circumvent” the sector-specific MIR and the financial frictions.
Thus, the law of motion for wage is identical as in the benchmark setting under autarky,18
and the autarkic steady state is still the unique, stable steady state under free trade.
Let us then consider the parameter configuration in region UB of figure 3. The cross-
sector investment in country i is inefficient in the autarkic steady state, χA < 1. According
to lemma 2, given χ∗ = χA < 1, country i has a comparative advantage in final good
17Subsection 3.2 endogenizes the world relative sectoral price χ∗ in a world-economy setting.
18Given µ∗ = 1, equation (30) coincides with (23).
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A for Y i0 > YA. We first focus on the case of Y
i
0 ∈ (YA, YˆT ). Free trade improves the
terms of trade and induces country i to specialize towards the high-price sector A. Both
the terms-of-trade effect and the specialization effect raise allocation efficiency so that
aggregate income in period 1 is higher than otherwise under autarky.
In period 1, the higher aggregate income then allows more agents to meet the MIR
and invest in sector A, which further strengthens country i’s comparative advantage and
magnifies its specialization towards sector A. In this case, free trade triggers a dynamic,
virtuous circle through which the rises in the mass of entrepreneurs and aggregate income
reinforce each other. The larger the world sectoral price differential, the stronger the
specialization effect and the terms-of-trade effect. If they dominates the decreasing MRK
effect, the dynamic, self-reinforcing specialization process propagates over time until the
mass of entrepreneurs becomes so high that their total debt capacity exceeds the entire
saving of households and country i specializes fully in sector A.19 In this case, free trade
destabilizes the autarkic steady state and multiple steady states arise. Given µ∗ = µA < 1,
the law of motion for wage under free trade has a slope at the autarkic steady state,20
∂wit+1
∂wit
|wA = 1− (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing MRK effect
+αη
(
1
θ
− 1
)
(1− µA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
specialization effect
. (31)
The specialization effect depends on four factors. The lower the λ and/or the Z, the
larger the investment distortions under autarky, the lower the µA, the larger the world
sectoral price differential, the stronger the specialization effect; the lower the θ, the less
dispersed the wealth distribution, the more sensitive the mass of entrepreneurs and the
sectoral investment to the change in aggregate income, the larger the specialization effect;
the higher the α, the weaker the decreasing MRK, the larger the specialization effect.
3.1.3 Wealth Inequality, Financial Development, and Multiple Steady States
Proposition 2. Let λT ≡ 1
1+ η
− (1−α)θ
α−θ −1
1−η
. Given θ ∈ (0, α), λT < 1 and ∂λT∂θ < 0. For
θ ∈ (0, α) and λ ∈ (0, λT ), multiple steady states may arise under free trade.
Figure 5 shows that multiple steady states may arise if {λ, θ} is in region M. The
rise in wealth inequality and/or the improvement in financial development weaken the
specialization effect, which reduces or even fully eliminates the possibility of multiple
steady states.21 We first focus on the case of θ ∈ (0, θˆ) and explore the underlying
mechanism behind multiple steady states, where θˆ is defined in proposition 1.
19For Y it > YˆT , the specialization effect vanishes and the dynamics of aggregate income are driven by
the terms-of-trade effect and the decreasing MRK effect.
20The terms-of-trade effect depends on the distance between the world relative price, χ∗, and the
underlying relative price under autarky, χi1. At the autarkic steady state, χ
i
1 = χA = χ
∗ so that the
terms-of-trade effect vanishes. Thus, it does not show up in equation 31. If the slope of the law of motion
for wage is evaluated at the point different from the autarkic steady state, the terms-of-trade effect will
kick in. The further away it is from the autarkic steady state, the stronger the terms-of-trade effect.
21If θ > α, there is a unique steady state in country i under free trade, regardless of the value of λ.
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Figure 5: Multiple Steady States under Free Trade in the {λ, θ} Space
Define two threshold values, λ˜T2 and λ˜T1, as the functions of the model parameters.
22
For λ = λ˜T2, µA = 1− θρη(1−θ) ; for λ = λ˜T1, µA = 1− 1−η
D−1
1−ηD , where D ≡ 1 + θ(1−α)α−θ . For
θ ∈ (0, θˆ), λ˜T2 < λ˜T1 < λ˜A, where λ˜A is defined by equation (25).
The left panel of figure 6 shows that, given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), multiple steady states arise
under free trade if {λ, Z} is in region M2-M1. The three threshold values determine the
borders of the four regions. Given χ∗ = χA, the solid (dashed) curves in figure 7 show the
laws of motion for wage under free trade (autarky), given the parameter configuration in
the four regions of the left panel of figure 6, respectively.
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Figure 6: Multiple Steady States under Free Trade: θ ∈ (0, α)
Let us start with {λ, Z} in region M2 where λ < λ˜T2. Given the tight borrowing
constraint and/or the high MIR (m) and/or the low productivity (R), the investment
distortions at the autarkic steady state are so large that µA < 1 − θρη(1−θ) . According
22Equations (61) and (64) describe the exact function forms of the two threshold values.
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Figure 7: Laws of Motion for Wage under Free Trade: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
to equation (31), the specialization effect dominates the decreasing MRK effect so that
free trade destabilizes the autarkic steady state,
∂wit+1
∂wit
|wA> 1. As shown in the upper-left
panel of figure 7, if country i has the initial income above (below) its autarkic steady-state
value, it converges to steady state H (L) where it specializes fully (partially) in sector A
(B). The wage rate at the three steady states are ranked as wH > wA > wL.
By raising λ and/or Z, we move from region M2 to M1 where λ ∈ (λ˜T2, λ˜T1). The
investment distortions at the autarkic steady state are mild so that 1 − θ
ηρ(1−θ) < µA <
1− 1−ηD−1
1−ηD . According to equation (31), the decreasing MRK effect dominates so that the
autarkic steady state is still stable under free trade,
∂wit+1
∂wit
|wA< 1. However, if the initial
income is above a threshold value wi0 > wM , the specialization effect and the terms-of-
trade effect dominate so that country i converges to steady state H with a higher wage
rate, wH > wM > wA. See the upper-right panel of figure 7.
By raising λ and/or Z further, we move into region UB where λ ∈ (λ˜T1, λ˜A). The
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investment distortions at the autarkic steady state are so small that 1− 1−ηD−1
1−ηD < µA < 1.
For wi0 ∈ (wA, wˆT ), the decreasing MRK effect always dominates so that the autarkic
steady state is still the unique, stable steady state under free trade.
For {λ, Z} in region US of the left panel of figure 6 where λ > λ˜A, χA = µA = 1. The
zero sectoral price differential eliminates the specialization effect. As mentioned before,
for Y i0 < Y¯A, free trade allows country i to “circumvent” the sector-specific MIR and
the financial frictions via the terms-of-trade effect. Then, the law of motion for wage is
identical as that in the benchmark setting under autarky.23 In this case, the autarkic
steady state is still the unique, stable steady state and, for Y i0 < Y¯A, free trade speeds up
the convergence for country i.
Let us consider a special case of θ → 0 where the wealth distribution degenerates into a
unit mass at lj = 1. As long as µ
∗ = µA < 1 or equivalently {λ, Z} in region UB of figure 3,
the specialization effect is arbitrarily large around the autarkic steady state, according to
equation (31). Free trade strictly leads to multiple steady states. According to equations
(25), (61), and (64), the three threshold values coincide, limθ→0 λ˜T2 = limθ→0 λ˜T1 =
limθ→0 λ˜A = 1− (Zη)ρ. Thus, region M1-US of figure 6 vanishes and region M2 coincides
with region UB of figure 3.
Finally, let us consider the case of θ ∈ (θˆ, α). According to equation (24) and figure 2,
the high wealth inequality weakens the investment composition effect so that the autarkic
steady state is unique. According to equation (31), the high wealth inequality also weakens
the specialization effect so that the decreasing MRK effect dominates and the autarkic
steady state is still stable under free trade. The right panel of figure 6 shows that, given
θ ∈ (θˆ, α), multiple steady states arise under free trade if the parameter configuration of
{λ, Z} is in region M1. The mechanism is identical as mentioned above.
Lemma 3. Given χ∗ = χA, if free trade leads to multiple steady states, the steady state
with the highest aggregate income features the full specialization in sector A.
To sum up, the extensive margin of sectoral investment is the key channel through
which aggregate income becomes a determinant of comparative advantage and through
which free trade may generate a dynamic, self-reinforcing, amplification process. The
lower the level of financial development (λ) and the degree of wealth inequality (θ), the
larger the extensive-margin responses to free trade, the stronger the specialization effect,
the more likely multiple steady states may arise in an individual country. Our finding
helps explain why countries which are inherently identical except for the initial conditions
may possibly converge to different income levels. However, it does not say whether income
divergence is inevitable under trade integration.
3.2 Symmetry Breaking in the World Economy
Under autarky, the relative sectoral price is determined domestically in each country and,
for the parameter configuration in region UB-US of figure 3, the world economy has a
unique, symmetric steady state. Trade integration decouples the relative sectoral price
from domestic conditions and aligns it with the world level. In the following, we identify
23Compare the bottom-right panel of figure 7 with the left panel of figure 4.
20
the conditions under which trade integration inevitably “breaks” the symmetric, autarkic
steady state and lead to asymmetric steady states where inherently identical countries
end up with different income levels.
3.2.1 The Symmetric Steady State
For the parameter configuration in region US-UB-M1 of figure 6, trade integration does
not destabilize the autarkic steady state for the small open economy so that the symmetric
autarkic steady state in the world economy is still stable; for the parameter configuration
in region M2, trade integration destabilizes the autarkic steady state for a small open
economy so that the world economy does not have the stable, symmetric steady state.
3.2.2 The Asymmetric Steady States
According to the upper-left panel of figure 7 and equation (30), given χ∗, if free trade
destabilizes the autarkic steady state, country i may end up either in steady state H
where it specializes fully in sector A with aggregate income YH =
(Rρ (µ∗)η−1)
ρ
1−α and exports
(1−η)YH
p∗,A units of final good A or in steady state L where it specializes partially towards
sector B with YL =
(
R
ρ
(µ∗)η
1−η(1−µ∗)(1+ςA
L
)
)ρ
1−α and imports −
ςAL ηYL
p∗,A units of final good A, where
ςAL < 0 is a function of µ
∗.
Suppose that the world economy is in a stable, asymmetric steady state where the
fraction δ of countries end up in steady state H with aggregate income YH and the rest
in steady state L with YL. The market of final good A clears at the world level,
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δ
(1− η)YH
pA,∗
= −(1− δ)ςAL
ηYL
pA,∗
, ⇒ δ =
−ςAL
(
µ∗
1−η(1−µ∗)(1+ςAL )
)ρ
1
η
− 1− ςAL
(
µ∗
1−η(1−µ∗)(1+ςAL )
)ρ , (32)
There exists a δ that supports the world relative sectoral price χ∗ = (µ∗)α.
Proposition 3. Given θ ∈ (0, α), there exists a threshold value λ˜TD as a function of Z
such that, for λ < λ˜TD, the world economy has a continuum of stable, asymmetric steady
states under trade integration where a fraction δ ∈ (δ−, δ+) ⊂ (0, 1) of the countries have
the income YH > YA and the rest have the income YL < YA.
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), the solid curve in figure 8 represents λ˜TD and splits the parameter
space into region Div and Cov. For {λ, Z} in region Div, λ < λ˜TD and trade integration
may lead to asymmetric steady states in the world economy. In the small-open-economy
setting, free trade leads to multiple steady states under the condition of χ∗ = χA, given
θ ∈ (0, θˆ) and {λ, Z} in region M2-M1 of the left panel of figure 6. In the world-economy
setting, we relax this condition so that trade integration leads to asymmetric steady states
even if {λ, Z} is in part of region UB of the left panel of figure 6.25
24Given the balanced trade at the country level, if the market for one final good clears at the world
level, the market for the other one must also clear, according to the Walras’ law.
25The dash-dotted curve shows λ˜A and and the dashed curve shows λ˜T1. The region between the two
curves is region UB of the left panel of figure 6.
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Figure 8: Symmetry Breaking in a World Economy under Trade Integration
If the asymmetric steady state is stable, trade integration may generate income di-
vergence rather than convergence among inherently identical countries. In this case, the
world economy is polarized into two groups of countries with different income levels. This
way, we offer a theoretical support for the view that international trade is a mechanism
through which rich countries become richer at the expense of poor countries.
According to figures 5 and 8, whether trade integration leads to convergence depends
on financial development and on wealth inequality. Thus, our model helps reconcile the
mixed empirical evidence from the institutional perspective.
4 Can Free Trade Solve the Global Imbalances?
So far, we have assumed that countries are inherently identical except for the initial
income levels so as to highlight the mechanism behind “symmetry breaking”. Needless to
say, countries differ in various aspects, e.g., endowments, technologies, institutions, etc.
In this section, we introduce the cross-country heterogeneity in financial development
and show that whether free trade can solve the global imbalances depends critically on
whether it leads to full specialization in the more financially developed country.
4.1 The Model with No Extensive-Margin Adjustment
For comparison purposes, we first analyze a simplified version of Antras and Caballero
(2009). The model setting differs from ours in the following aspects. First, there is no
sector-specific MIR, i.e., m = 0. Second, agents differ in the technology endowment.
Some agents can invest in sector A and they are called entrepreneurs, while others can
only invest in sector B and they are called households. The mass of entrepreneurs is
exogenous at τ . Besides, each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young.
Third, entrepreneurs can borrow up to (λi − 1) times of their net wealth, where λi ≥ 1
reflects the level of financial development in country i. If the borrowing constraints are
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binding, the leverage ratio is exogenous at 1
λi
. Fourth, the world economy consists of two
countries, N (North) and S (South), which only differ in the level of financial development.
Assumption 1. 0 < τ < η < 1.
Under autarky, equations (4)-(5) describe the sectoral demand for investment and
labor. In the case of efficient allocation, the sectoral rate of return equalizes, µit+1 = 1,
and the sectoral investment is proportional to the sector share in the aggregate production
function, M i,At = ηw
i
t and M
i,B
t = (1−η)wit. Under assumption 1, the efficient investment
size in sector A exceeds the total net wealth of entrepreneurs, M i,At > w
i
tτ , implying that
entrepreneurs need to borrow the amount of (η − τ)wit.
Let λ¯ ≡ η
τ
. If λi ≥ λ¯, the total debt capacity of entrepreneurs exceeds the amount of
loans required for the efficient investment in sector A, (λi− 1)witτ > (η− τ)wit. Thus, the
sectoral investment is efficient, µit+1 = 1, and the borrowing constraints are slack.
For λi ∈ [1, λ¯), the total debt capacity of entrepreneurs is below the efficient amount of
loans. Thus, the sectoral investment is inefficient, µit+1 < 1 and the borrowing constraints
are binding. Due to the exogeneity in the mass of entrepreneurs τ and in the leverage
ratio 1
λi
, the sectoral supply of investment is a constant fraction of aggregate saving,
M i,At
wit
= λiτ < η and
M i,Bt
wit
= 1− λiτ > 1− η. (33)
Then, the changes in aggregate income only affect the sectoral investment on the intensive
margin. As the extensive margin is mute, the sectoral investment ratio is constant and so
is the relative sectoral rate of return. Combine (4) and (33) to get
M i,At
M i,Bt
=
λiτ
1− λiτ and µ
i
t+1 = µ
i
A =
1
η
− 1
1
λiτ
− 1 ∈ (
1
η
− 1
1
τ
− 1 , 1) and
∂µiA
∂λi
> 0. (34)
Combine them with equations (21)-(22) to get the law of motion for wage and the solution
to the interest rate. Note that the aggregate efficiency indicator is constant and so is the
ratio of the interest rate over the social rate of return,
Γit = Γ
i
A =
(µiA)
η
1− η + ηµiA
and
rit
Υit
= 1− η + ηµiA.
Assumption 2. 1 ≤ λS < λN ≤ λ¯.
Lemma 4. Under autarky, if assumptions 1-2 hold, the borrowing constraints are binding
and there exists a unique, stable steady state in each country where Y NA > Y
S
A , χ
N
A > χ
S
A,
µNA > µ
S
A, and r
N
A > r
S
A.
Suppose that the world economy is in the autarkic steady state before period 0. If
agents are allowed to borrow and lend abroad from period 0 on, financial capital flows are
“uphill” from country S to N. Here, the global imbalances are an equilibrium response
to cross-country differences in financial development (Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas,
2008; Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull, 2009; von Hagen and Zhang, 2014).
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4.1.1 Free Trade and Cross-Country Interest Rate Reversal
Suppose that the world economy moves from autarky to free trade in the way specified
in subsection 3.1. Equations (27) and (28) specify the sectoral demand for investment in
period t and for labor in period t + 1, respectively. Since µ∗t+1 < µ
N
A < 1, the borrowing
constraints are binding so that equations (33) specify the sectoral supply of investment.
The positive investment in sector B implies the coupling of the interest rate with the rate
of return in sector B. Combine (27) and (33) to get
ς i,At+1 =
1
η
[
1 + µ∗t+1(
1
λiτ
− 1)] − 1 ∈ (−1, 1η − 1), (35)
which reflects the degree of specialization.26
Given the world relative sectoral rate of return µ∗t+1, the law of motion for wage and
the interest rate in country i are specified as follows,
wit+1 =
(
R
ρ
witΓ
i
t
)α
, where Γit = (1− τλi)(µ∗t+1)η + τλi(µ∗t+1)η−1, (36)
rit = Υ
i
t[1− η(1− µ∗t+1)(1 + ς i,At+1)] =
Υit
1 + τλi( 1
µ∗t+1
− 1) < Υ
i
t ≡ ρ
wit+1
wit
. (37)
The world market clearing condition for final good A determines the world relative sectoral
price χ∗t+1 as well as the world relative sectoral rate of return µ
∗
t+1,
V N,At+1 ς
N,A
t+1 + V
S,A
t+1 ς
S,A
t+1 = 0, ⇒ wNt+1ςN,At+1 + wSt+1ςS,At+1 = 0. (38)
Proposition 4. Starting from the autarkic steady state, free trade induces country N (S)
to specialize partially to sector A (B). It raises the level and keeps the rank of aggregate
income in the two countries, while it reverses the cross-country interest rate pattern.
Let us first consider country S. Given χSA < χ
N
A , country S has a comparative advantage
in final good B. By the same logic as mentioned in subsection 3.1.2, free trade raises
(reduces) the domestic demand for labor and investment in sector B (A). Due to the
exogeneity in the mass of entrepreneurs and the leverage ratio, the sectoral investment
does not respond to the demand change. Since free trade only triggers the cross-sector
reallocation of labor, the capital-labor ratio declines (rises) in sector B (A) in period 1.
Thus, the MRK rises (declines) in sector B (A) in period 1 and so does the sectoral rate
of return in period 0. Coupled with the rate of return in sector B, the interest rate also
rises in period 0, rS0 = q
S,B
1 R > q
S,B
A R = r
S
A. By the same logic, free trade triggers the
labor reallocation in country N towards sector A and the rise in the capital-labor ratio in
sector B leads to the declines in the rate of return in sector B and the interest rate.
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses of three endogenous variables upon free trade
in period t = 1. The left panel shows that free trade induces country N (S) to specializes
partially towards sector A (B). The middle panel shows that moving from autarky to free
trade not only raises (reduces) the interest rate in country S (N) but also reverses the
cross-country interest rate patterns. Thus, Antras and Caballero (2009) argue that free
trade can reverse the direction of financial capital flows.
26If country i fully specializes in sector A, ςi,At =
1
η − 1; if it fully specializes in sector B, ςi,At = −1. If
it partially specializes in sector A, ςi,At ∈ (0, 1η − 1); if it partially specializes in sector B, ςi,At ∈ (−1, 0).
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Figure 9: Model Dynamics under Free Trade with the Exogenous Extensive Margin
4.1.2 Can Free Trade and Capital Flows Lead to FPE?
Free trade affects aggregate income in each country through the terms-of-trade effect
and the specialization effect. As free trade only triggers the cross-sector reallocation of
labor, the specialization effect is small and dominated by the terms-of-trade effect so that
aggregate income rises in country S. Due to the positive terms-of-trade and specialization
effects, aggregate income rises in country N. Overall, free trade does not change the rank
of aggregate income in the two countries. See the right panel of figure 9.
Intuitively, the sector-specific financial frictions distort aggregate allocation in two
dimensions. On the intra-temporal dimension, the cross-sector investment composition
is distorted so that the MRK is not equalized in the two sectors, µit+1 < 1; on the
inter-temporal dimension, the aggregate credit demand and supply are distorted so that
the private and the social rates of return are not equalized,
rit
Υit
= 1 − η(1 − µit+1) < 1.
Free trade alone equalizes globally the ratio rather than the level of sectoral MRK, while
financial capital mobility alone equalizes globally the interest rate rather than the social
rate of return. In either case, the factor prices are not equalized.
Let us start from the steady state under free trade. The relative sectoral price is
equalized χSt = χ
N
t and so is the relative sectoral rate of return, µ
S
t+1 = (χ
S
t+1)
1
α =
(χNt+1)
1
α = µNt+1. If agents are also allowed to borrow and lend abroad, the interest rate
is equalized, rSt = r
N
t . According to equation (33), sector B is always active so that the
interest rate is coupled with the rate of return in sector B. Thus, the rate of return in
sector B is also equalized, qS,Bt+1R = r
S
t = r
N
t = q
N,B
t+1 R.
Overall, allowing free trade and capital flows implicitly equalizes the rate of return in
sector A, qS,At+1R =
qS,Bt+1R
µSt+1
=
qN,Bt+1 R
µNt+1
= qN,At+1 R. Despite international immobility of labor, the
wage rate is equalized and so is aggregate income,
Y St+1 =
wSt+1
1− α =
[(qS,At+1)
η(qS,Bt+1)
1−η]−ρ
1− α =
[(qN,At+1 )
η(qN,Bt+1 )
1−η]−ρ
1− α =
wNt+1
1− α = Y
N
t+1.
In this model and in the model of Antras and Caballero (2009), allowing both free trade
and capital flows leads to FPE and income convergence. Thus, global imbalances vanish.
The results of the interest rate reversal and FPE depend critically on the coupling of
the interest rate with the rate of return in sector B. This feature exists as long as the
25
unconstrained sector B is active M i,Bt > 0 in each country, which is then ensured by the
exogeneity in the mass of entrepreneurs and the leverage ratio in this model.
4.2 The Model with the Extensive-Margin Adjustment
We revisit Antras-Caballero’s results in a two-country version of our model. Let λi and
Li denote the level of financial development and the population size per generation in
country i ∈ {N,S}. Let δ ≡ LN
LN+LS
denote the population share of country N in the
world economy. The two countries are inherently identical except for the level of financial
development and the population size.
In our model, the mass of entrepreneurs and the leverage ratio are endogenous so that
the extensive margin of sectoral investment becomes a critical channel through which free
trade may lead to full specialization, as shown in subsection 3.1. In this case, sector B is
inactive so that the interest rate is decoupled from the rate of return in sector B. Then,
Antras-Caballero’s results on the interest rate reversal and on the FPE may not hold. In
order to explore this mechanism, we focus on the parameter configuration that ensures
full specialization under free trade.
Assumption 3. Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), the parameter configuration in each country {λi, Z} is
in region M2-M1 of the left panel of figure 6. Besides, 0 < λS < λN < λ˜T1.
Lemma 5. Under autarky, if assumption 3 holds, the borrowing constraints are binding
and there exists a unique, stable steady state in each country where Y NA > Y
S
A , χ
N
A > χ
S
A,
µNA > µ
S
A, and r
N
A > r
S
A.
Lemma 5 is qualitatively identical as lemma 4. Suppose that the world economy is
in the autarkic steady state before period 0. If agents are allowed to borrow and lend
abroad from period 0 on, the global imbalances also arise in the current model.
4.2.1 Does Free Trade Lead to the Interest Rate Reversal?
For pedagogical purpose, we answer this question in a small-open-economy setting (δ → 0)
in two steps. First, we analyze the interest rate pattern in country N under free trade in
a special case of λN = λS. Second, we analyze how free trade affects the cross-country
interest rate pattern in the case of λN > λS.
Suppose that the world economy moves from autarky to free trade in the way specified
in subsection 3.1. For δ → 0, the population size in country N is negligible, in comparison
with that in country S. Trade integration with country N has a negligible impact on the
economic allocation in country S. Thus, from period t = 1 on, the world relative sectoral
price is determined by that in country S, χ∗t = χ
S
A < 1. As a small open economy, country
N takes the world relative sectoral price χNt = χ
∗ < 1 as given.
Step 1: Interest Rate Patterns in Country N under Free Trade
In this small-open-economy setting, we suppress the country index i ∈ {N,S} and
use the superscript ∗ to denote the value of endogenous variable on the world level. The
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interest rate is a piecewise function of aggregate income over three intervals, depending
on whether country N fully specializes in sector A and whether the borrowing constraints
are binding. Let λ ≡ λS = λN , w¯T ≡ (1 − λ) 11−θF, and wˆT ≡ (1 − λµ∗ )
1
1−θF. Given
assumption 3, µ∗ = µA < 1 so that w¯T > wˆT > 0.
1.) For wt > w¯T , the mass of entrepreneurs is sufficiently large so that the aggregate credit
demand pushes the interest rate above the rate of return in sector B and equal to the rate
of return in sector A, rt = q
A
t+1R > q
B
t+1R. Households lend out their entire labor income
rather than invest in sector B. Country N specializes fully in sector A and the social rate
of return is equal to the rate of return in sector A. The zero spread qAt+1R− rt = 0 implies
that the borrowing constraints are slack.
rt = Rq
A
t+1 = Υt =
ρwt+1
wt
,
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= − (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing MRK effect
< 0. (39)
The higher the aggregate income, the higher the aggregate saving and investment, the
higher the capital-labor ratio in sector A, the lower the social rate of return and the
interest rate, due to the decreasing MRK effect.
2.) For wt ∈ (wˆT , w¯T ), the mass of entrepreneurs is moderately large so that the aggregate
credit demand keeps the interest rate above the rate of return in sector B and below that
in sector A, rt ∈ (qBt+1R, qAt+1R). Country N specializes fully in sector A and the social
rate of return is equal to the rate of return in sector A, Υt = q
A
t+1R. The positive spread
qAt+1R−rt > 0 implies that the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt = 1−λ q
A
t+1R
rt
< 1−λ.
Combine equation (30) with the binding borrowing constraints to get
rt =
λqAt+1R
1− ψt =
λΥt
1− ψt < Υt,
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= − (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing MRK effect
+
ψt
1− ψt (1− θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive-margin effect
, (40)
where ψt =
(
wt
F
)1−θ
. Besides the decreasing MRK effect, the rise in aggregate income
allows more agents to meet the MIR and become entrepreneurs so that the aggregate
credit supply (demand) declines (rises) on the extensive margin, which tends to raise the
interest rate. If the extensive-margin effect dominates the decreasing MRK effect, the
interest rate rises in aggregate income.
Lemma 6. Let w˜T ≡ F
(1+ 1−θ1−α)
1
1−θ
. For λ < 1
1+ 1−α
1−θ
and wt ∈ (max{w˜T , wˆT}, w¯T ), the
interest rate rises in aggregate income.
3.) For wt ∈ (0, wˆT ), the mass of entrepreneurs is so low that their total debt capacity is
less than the entire labor income of households. Households invest in sector B and lend
to the credit market. The no-arbitrage condition implies rt = q
B
t+1R. Given µ
∗ < 1, the
positive spread qAt+1R− rt = qAt+1R(1−µ∗) > 0 implies the binding borrowing constraints
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and the constant leverage ratio ψt = ψ
∗ = 1− λ
µ∗ . Combine equations (29)-(30) to get
rt = q
B
t+1R = Υt[1− η(1− µ∗)(1 + ςAt+1)] =
Υt
1 + 1−µ
∗
µ∗
(
wt
wˆT
) 1−θ
θ
< Υt
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= − (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing MRK effect
− (1− α)
(
1
θ
− 1)
1 + µ
∗
1−µ∗
(
wˆT
wt
) 1
θ
−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
specialization effect
< 0. (41)
As shown in subsection 3.1.2, given χ∗ = χA < 1, country i has a comparative advantage in
final good A for Yt > YA. Free trade leads to the reallocation of labor and investment from
sector B to A. According to equations (27)-(28), the sectoral capital-labor ratio moves
in equal proportions. The larger the aggregate income, the stronger its comparative
advantage, the larger the specialization effect, the larger the rise in the capital-labor
ratio, the lower the sectoral rate of return. This way, the specialization effect reinforces
the decreasing MRK effect so that the rate of return in sector B declines in aggregate
income and so does the interest rate.
Lemma 7. Given θ ∈ (0, α), there is a threshold value λ˜TH < λ˜T1 such that, for λ < λ˜TH ,
free trade leads to multiple steady states and the interest rate is higher in the high-income
than in the low-income stable steady state, given χ∗ = χA.
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Figure 10: Interest Rate Patterns in Stable Steady States under Free Trade: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
Let λ˜TS denote another threshold value such that, for λ < λ˜TS, free trade leads to
multiple steady states and the borrowing constraints are slack at the high-income stable
steady state. Figure 10 illustrates lemma 7, given that θ takes a low and a high value
in the interval of (0, θˆ), respectively. The parameter space is split into four regions by
three threshold values, i.e., λ˜TS, λ˜TH , and λ˜T1. In particular, region U corresponds to
region US-UB in figure 6 where, given χ∗ = χA, the autarkic steady state is the unique
steady state under free trade; region HS-HB1-HB2 corresponds to region M2-M1 in figure
28
6 where free trade leads to multiple steady states. The solid (dashed) curve in figure 11
shows the interest rate (the social rate of return) as the function of aggregate income,
given the parameter configuration in the three regions of figure 10, respectively.
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Figure 11: Rate-of-Return Patterns under Free Trade: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
In the case of multiple steady states under free trade, the borrowing constraints are
binding at the low-income stable steady state L where rL < ΥL = ρ.
• For the parameter configuration in region HS of figure 10 where λ < λ˜TS, wH ≥ w¯T .
According to the left panel of figure 11, the borrowing constraints are slack at the
high-income stable steady state H where rH = ΥH = ρ. In this case, rH > rL.
• For the parameter configuration in region HB1 of figure 10 where λ ∈ (λ˜TS, λ˜TH),
wH < w¯T . According to the middle panel of figure 11, the borrowing constraints
are binding at steady state H where rH < ΥH = ρ. In this case, rH > rL.
• For the parameter configuration in region HB2 of figure 10 where λ ∈ (λ˜TH , λ˜T1),
wH < w¯T . According to the right panel of figure 11, the borrowing constraints are
binding at steady state H where rH < ΥH = ρ. In this case, rH < rL.
Compare the two panels of figure 10. The lower the λ and/or the θ, the larger the
cross-sector distortion under autarky, the lower the χA, the larger the world sectoral
price differential, the stronger the specialization effect, the higher the wH , the more likely
rH > rL, the larger the region HS-HB1.
Step 2: Cross-Country Interest Rate Patterns under Free Trade
Assumption 4. Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), the parameter configuration in each country {λi, Z} is
in region HS of figure 10 and λS < λN .
Given assumption 4, country N has a unique, stable steady state AN under autarky
and multiple steady states arise under free trade. The solid (dashed) curve in the left panel
of figure 12 shows the law of motion for wage in country N under free trade (autarky).
Given λS < λN , µ∗ = µS < µN so that the wage rate is higher in the autarkic steady state
than in the unstable steady state under free trade, wNA > w
N
M . Starting from the autarkic
steady state, country N converges to steady state H under free trade where wNH > w
N
A .
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Figure 12: Law of Motion for Wage and Interest Rate Pattern under Free Trade: δ → 0
Let us then consider the interest rate responses. The solid (dashed) curve in the
right panel of figure 12 shows the interest rate (the social rate of return) in country
N as the function of aggregate income under free trade. As shown in subsection 4.2.1,
for wNt ∈ (0, wˆNT ), sector B is active and the interest rate, which is coupled with the
rate of return in sector B, declines in aggregate income; for wNt ∈ (wˆNT , w¯NT ), country N
specializes fully in sector A and the interest rate, which is decoupled from the rate of
return in sector B, may rise in aggregate income. Thus, the interest rate response may
be non-monotonous along the convergence path towards steady state H. As shown in the
right panel of figure 12, wNH > w¯
N
T so that the borrowing constraints are slack at steady
state H with rNH = ρ > r
N
A > r
S
A.
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Figure 13: Model Dynamics under Free Trade: δ → 0
Figure 13 shows the impulse responses of endogenous variables. Between period t = 0
and t = 2, country N specializes partially towards sector A and, according to the logic of
Antras and Caballero (2009), free trade leads to the interest rate reversal. From period
t = 3 on, country N specializes fully in sector A so that ςN,A4 =
1
η
− 1. With MN,Bt = 0,
the interest rate is decoupled from the rate of return in sector B. Eventually, moving
from autarky to free trade widens the cross-country interest rate differentials, opposite to
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Antras-Caballero’s results.
To sum up, Antras-Caballero’s results depend critically on the exogeneity in the lever-
age ratio and the mass of investors in each sector. By endogenizing them, we feature the
possibility of full specialization under free trade and explore its implications for the in-
terest rate. In this sense, our findings complement Antras-Caballero’s results.
4.2.2 Can Free Trade and Capital Flows Lead to FPE?
According to the middle and right panels of figure 13, moving from autarky to free trade
eventually amplifies the cross-country differences in aggregate income and the interest
rate. Starting from the steady state under free trade, if agents are also allowed to borrow
and lend abroad, financial capital flows are “uphill” from country S to N, which further
widens the cross-country output gap and amplifies the global imbalances. In this case,
allowing free trade and capital flows does not lead to FPE and income convergence.
However, allowing free trade and capital flows may lead to FPE in another case.
According to the left and the middle panels of figure 13, country N specializes partially
towards sector A between period t = 0 and t = 2 and, due to the interest rate coupling
with the rate of return in sector B, free trade leads to the interest rate reversal. If agents
are allowed to borrow and lend abroad within this time interval, financial capital flows
are “downhill” from country N to S. In this case, allowing free trade and capital flows
immediately leads to FPE and income convergence, as shown in subsection 4.1.2.
To sum up, whether trade and financial integration jointly can lead to FPE and
income convergence depends not only on the degrees of financial development and wealth
inequality but also on the timing of integration. As long as the unconstrained sector is
active in all countries upon integration, FPE and income convergence will be achieved.
5 Alternative Assumptions
Many assumptions are made to simplify the analysis and to isolate the core mechanism.
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results under alternative assumptions.
Financial Development and Productivity
As is well documented in the literature, the financial sectors not only promote economic
development and productivity growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, Loayza, and Beck,
2000) but also evolve endogenously along the process of economic growth (Acemoglu and
Zilibotti, 1997; Laeven, Levine, and Michalopoulos, 2015; Song and Thakor, 2010). In
particular, the financial sectors are more efficient and the level of productivity is also
higher in the rich than in the poor countries.
In our model, the level of financial development λ and the sectoral productivity R are
exogenous and uncorrelated. Allowing them to move positively with aggregate income
would strengthen the comparative advantage of rich countries in the high-MIR sector,
which would reinforce the specialization effect and make symmetry breaking more likely.
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Wealth Inequality and Investment Distortions
In our model, agents differ only in net wealth and financial frictions distortion the size
of sectoral investment. The higher the degree of wealth inequality, the larger the mass of
agents who can overcome the MIR and invest in the high-return sector, the more efficient
the cross-sector investment allocation, the smaller the sectoral price differential. It is
an application of the trickle-down theory of wealth inequality and capital accumulation
(Aghion and Bolton, 1997). In this case, the higher the wealth inequality the small the
specialization effect, the less likely free trade leads to income divergence.
If agents differ in net wealth and in productivity (Alder, forthcoming; Buera, Kaboski,
and Shin, 2011; Buera and Shin, 2013), financial frictions distort the size and the average
productivity of sectoral investment. If wealth and talent are not perfectly correlated,
wealth inequality may reduce efficiency in the presence of financial frictions, because
highly productive agents may not have sufficient net wealth to overcome the MIR. In this
case, the higher the degree of wealth inequality, the larger the sectoral price differential,
the stronger the specialization effect, the more likely the income divergence.
Despite the opposite predictions on the impacts of wealth inequality, the two settings
still share the same predictions on the impacts of financial development.
Economic Openness and Wealth Inequality
In our model, the shape of wealth distribution is featured by an exogenous parameter
θ, independent of income changes, financial development, and economic openness. It al-
lows us to show explicitly how wealth inequality may affect the consequences of economic
integration. Since Kuznets (1955) documented a famous inverted-U shape relationship
between inequality and income, many economists have analyzed the dynamic interactions
between income/wealth inequality and economic development (Aghion and Bolton, 1997;
Galor and Zeira, 1993). Recently, Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou (2013) show that
trade globalization is associated with a reduction in inequality, while financial globaliza-
tion is associated with a rise in inequality. The endogenous interactions between economic
openness and inequality may have profound implications for the symmetry breaking mech-
anism. We keep them for future research.
6 Final Remarks
In this paper, we first prove that trade integration leads to convergence (divergence) of the
income level among financially developed (underdeveloped) countries. This finding has
the potential to reconcile the mixed empirical evidence on trade integration and income
dynamics in different groups of countries. One can include the financial development
indicators in the empirical test of trade integration and income dynamics to check whether
they can significantly improve the test results.
In our model, the financially developed countries strictly benefit from integrating with
the underdeveloped ones. Our findings help explain the fact that the developed countries
which have the well-developed financial sector, e.g., the OECD countries, actively pro-
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mote trade liberalization at the regional and the global levels, and free trade agreements
among them survive longer and are gradually upgraded to higher stages, e.g., Custom
Unions, Common Markets, and etc. In contrast, free trade agreements among develop-
ing countries which have the underdeveloped financial sector, e.g., African countries and
ASEAN countries, either do not perform well or eventually break down (Venables, 2003).
As the second contribution of this paper, we revisit the results of Antras and Caballero
(2009) and prove that whether free trade can solve the global imbalances depends on
whether it leads to full specialization in the more developed countries. In our model,
“physical capital” should be interpreted broadly to include human capital or any capital
good used in production; the “MIR sector” should also be interpreted broadly to include
goods, services, or tasks that require the high initial investment in terms of physical
and/or human capital. As is widely documented in the literature, developed countries
become more and more specialized in the goods/tasks with the high MIR and offshore the
production of other goods/tasks using trade and FDI. It is an empirical question whether
developed countries have fully specialized in those MIR sectors.
Our paper has some policy implications for developing countries. Given their mod-
erately low levels of financial development and productivity, these countries should be
cautious of the timing and sequence of trade or capital account liberalization27 as well
as the partners with whom they are integrated. In particular, market-reform policies
aiming at improving domestic financial sectors, institutional structures, and productivity
are more essential than simply reducing the barriers to trade or financial capital flows. In
the last two decades, the fast income convergence in the Central and Eastern European
countries offers a good example. Following the 2004 EU enlargement, the adoption of EU
laws and directives has significantly improved financial sector quality in CEECs by up-
grading their legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework to the same standard as in the
Western Europe. Furthermore, the significant dominance of foreign banks in the CEECs’
financial markets also improved the quality of domestic banking sectors (Herrmann and
Winkler, 2009a,b; von Hagen and Zhang, 2014).
We do not mean that countries should first improve its financial institutions before
opening up to trade and capital flows. In fact, trade and capital account liberalizations
affect the incentives for financial intermediaries (Alessandria and Qian, 2005; Svaleryd and
Vlachos, 2002; Tressel and Verdier, 2011) as well as the structures of financial markets
from the political economy perspective (Braun and Raddatz, 2008; Rajan and Zingales,
2003, 2004). Developing countries may use trade and capital account liberalization as a
triggering device and combine them with other market-reform policies to promote financial
development and productivity growth.
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Online Appendix
A Technical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. If the borrowing constraints are binding under autarky, qi,At+1R > rt or equivalently µt+1 <
1. Combine equations (6) and (8) and use the definition of µt+1 to get (19). Equation (20) is
derived from the equalization of the investment demand and supply in sector A
ηµt+1
1− η + ηµt+1wt = M
i,A
t =
∫ ∞
t
nj,t
ψt
dG(j) =

− 1−θ
θ
t
ψt
wt.
Combine equations (11), (19)-(20) to get
Yt =
(
1 +
1− η
ηµt+1
)− θ
1−θ (1− λµt+1 )
1
1−θm
(1− α)(1− θ) ,
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnYt
=
1− θ
λ
µt+1−λ +
θ 1−η
η
µt+1+
1−η
η
> 0 (42)
given Yt,
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnm
= −∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnYt
< 0,
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnλ
=
1
1 + θ 1−η1−η(1−µt+1)
µt+1−λ
λ
> 0.
If the borrowing constraints are weakly binding, the sectoral investment is efficient and µt+1 = 1.
Combine it with equation (42) to get the threshold value Y¯A.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Combine equations (1)-(4) to get (21) as the law of motion for wage under autarky.
According to lemma 1, for wt ≥ w¯A ≡ (1−α)Y¯A, the sectoral investment is efficient µt+1 = 1.
Combine it with (21) and the law of motion for wage wt+1 =
(
R
ρwt
)α
is concave
Jt ≡ ∂wt+1
∂wt
= α
wt+1
wt
, and lim
wt→∞
Jt = lim
wt→∞
α
(
R
ρ
)α
wα−1t = 0. (43)
Ht ≡ ∂
2wt+1
∂w2t
= (α− 1)Jt
wt
< 0. (44)
For wt ∈ (0, w¯A), the sectoral investment is inefficient, µt+1 ∈ (λ, 1). The law of motion for
wage is determined jointly by
wt = (1− λ
µt+1
)
1
1−θ
(
1 +
1− η
ηµt+1
)− θ
1−θ
F and wt+1 =
(
R
ρ
wt
(µt+1)
η
1− η + ηµt+1
)α
. (45)
Jt =
wt+1
wt
α+ αη(1− µt+1)1+ η
1−ηλ
(1− λ
µt+1
)(1−θ) − 1
 , limwt→0Jt =∞. (46)
Equations (43) and (46) ensure the existence of at least one steady state under autarky. The
steady state is unique iff Jt |wt+1=wt< 1 always holds at the steady state.
• If there is a steady state with wt > w¯A, according to equation (43), Jt |wt+1=wt= α < 1
so that the uniqueness condition is satisfied;
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• if there is a steady state with wt ∈ (0, w¯A), according to equation (46), Jt |wt+1=wt may
exceed unity. If so, the uniqueness condition is violated and multiple steady states arise.
In the following, we derive the threshold values in the parameter space for the uniqueness of
steady state by keeping Jt |wt+1=wt< 1 in the interval of wt ∈ (0, w¯A).
Let µˆ ∈ (λ, 1) denote the relative MRK at a steady state where the borrowing constraints
are binding. According to equation (24), the uniqueness condition is reformulated as
µˆ2 −Bµˆ+C > 0 where B ≡ 1 + λ− 1
ρη(1− θ)
(
θ +
λη
1− η
)
, C ≡ λ
(
1
ρη
+ 1
)
. (47)
µˆ2 −Bµˆ+C =

λ
ρ(1−η)(1−θ)
(
λ+ 1−ηη
)
> 0, for µˆ = λ;
λ
ρ(1−η)(1−θ)
1−(1−η)θ
η +
θ
ρη(1−θ) > 0, for µˆ = 1.
(48)
Let θˇ ≡ 1 −
λη
1−η+1
ρη(1−λ)+1 , λˇ ≡
1− θ
ρη(1−θ)
1+ 1
(1−θ)ρ(1−η)
, and θˆ ≡ θˇ |λ=0= 11+ 1
ρη
. Since (47) holds at the two
boundary points, there are three cases where it holds for the entire interval of µˆ ∈ (λ, 1).
1. Case 1: B2 > 1. However, given λ ∈ (0, 1), B2 > 1 does not hold.
2. Case 2: B2 < λ. In this case, θ ∈ (θˇ, 1) or equivalently λ ∈ (λˇ, 1). In particular, for
θ ∈ (θˆ, 1), condition (47) holds for the entire space of λ ∈ (0, 1).
3. Case 3: B2 ∈ (λ, 1) and B2 − 4C < 0. In this case, θ ∈ (0, θˇ), λ ∈ (0, λˇ), and
Aλ2 − 2Bλ+ C < 0, where A ≡
(
1− 1
ρ(1− η)(1− θ)
)2
, C ≡
(
1− θ
ρη(1− θ)
)2
, (49)
B ≡
(
1− 1
ρ(1− η)(1− θ)
)(
θ
ρη(1− θ) − 1
)
+ 2
(
1
ηρ
+ 1
)
.
• For ρ(1− η)(1− θ) = 1, (49) holds if λ ∈ (λA, 1), where λA ≡ C2B =
(
1− θ
ρη(1−θ)
)2
4
(
1
ρη
+1
) .
• For ρ(1− η)(1− θ) 6= 1, (49) holds if λ ∈ (λA, 1), where λA ≡ B−
√
B2−AC
A .
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Let λˆA ≡ λA |θ=0. Figure 2 shows λA as a function of θ and has a horizontal intercept at λˆA.
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), we derive the threshold values in the {λ, Z} space for the uniqueness of the
autarkic steady state. Let XA denote the steady-state value of variable Xt under autarky.
Detour: the Mapping between ψA and Z
Let Z ≡ Rηρ
(
1−θ
m
) 1
ρ . Consider the case of the unique steady state under autarky. As the steady-
state value of variable ψt, ψA is a function of parameters as defined below.
• If the borrowing constraints are binding at the steady state, µA ∈ (λ, 1) and ψA = 1− λµA <
1− λ. Combine them with equations (45) to get
Z = ψ
1
ρ(1−θ)
A
[
1 +
(1− η)(1− ψA)
ηλ
]1− θ
ρ(1−θ)
(
λ
1− ψA
)1−η
. (50)
28For λ = 0, Aλ2 − 2Bλ + C = C ≥ 0; for λ = λˇA, Aλ2 − 2Bλ + C = −4λρ (1−η)
2
η [(1− λ)ρη + 1] < 0.
Thus, λA ∈ (0, λˇA).
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• If the borrowing constraints are slack at the steady state, µA = 1 and the individual
agent’s choices are indeterminant. We consider a particular equilibrium where agents
who can meet the MIR still invest the entire labor income and choose the same leverage
ratio ψt > 1− λ. In the steady state, combine µA = 1 with (11), (20)-(21) to get
Z = ψ
1
ρ(1−θ)
A η
−
[
1− θ
ρ(1−θ)
]
(51)
Figure 14 shows that, under autarky, multiple steady states arise for {λ, ψA} in region M,
while the steady state is unique and the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) for {λ, ψA}
in region UB (US). Figure 3 is a mapping of figure 14 by using equations (50)-(51) to convert
the borders of three regions from the {λ, ψA} space to the {λ, Z} space. In the following, we
characterize the borders of three regions in figure 14.
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Figure 14: Multiple Steady States under Autarky: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
If the borrowing constraints are weakly binding at the steady state, ψA = 1− λ. It defines
the border between region US and UB. Combine it with (51) to get λ˜A as defined in (25).
If multiple steady states arise under autarky, the borrowing constraints are either binding
ψH < 1−λ or slack ψH > 1−λ at the high-income, stable steady state H. See the right panel of
figure 4. In each scenario, we characterize the boundary case where the law of motion for wage
is tangent with the 45◦ line at steady state M with wM ∈ (0, w¯A).
Let µM denote the steady-state value of µt+1 at point M. Let condition (47) hold with
equality and we solve µM as a function of λ and other parameters.
µM =
B±√B2 − 4C
2
, where B ≡ 1 + λ− 1
ρη(1− θ)
(
θ +
λη
1− η
)
, C ≡ λ
(
1
ρη
+ 1
)
. (52)
Given wM ∈ (0, w¯A), use equation (45) to get
wM =
(
1− λ
µM
) 1
1−θ
(
1 +
1
η − 1
µM
)− θ
1−θ m
1− θ =
 R
ρη
µη−1M
1 +
1
η
−1
µM
ρ . (53)
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• If the borrowing constraints are binding at steady state H, wH ∈ (0, w¯A) and µH < 1.
Use equation (45) to get
wH = ψ
1
1−θ
H
(
1 +
1
η − 1
µH
)− θ
1−θ m
1− θ =
 R
ρη
µη−1H
1 +
1
η
−1
µH
ρ , and ψH = 1− λ
µH
. (54)
Combine equations (53) and (54) to get
ψH =
(
1− λ
µM
)[
η + 1−ηµM
η + (1−η)(1−ψH)λ
](1−θ)ρ−θ (
µMλ
1− ψH
)(1−θ)(1−η)ρ
. (55)
The border between region UB and M in figure 14 is characterized by {λ, ψA} satisfying
equations (52) and (55).
• If the borrowing constraints are slack at steady state H, wH > w¯A and µH = 1. Combine
µH = 1 and ψH > 1− λ with (54) to get
wH = ψ
1
1−θ
H η
θ
1−θ
m
1− θ =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
. (56)
Combine equations (53) and (56) to get
ψH =
(
1− λ
µM
)(
η +
1− η
µM
)(1−θ)ρ−θ
µ
(1−θ)(1−η)ρ
M . (57)
The border between region US and M in figure 14 is characterized by {λ, ψA} satisfying
equations (52) and (57).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. For notational simplicity, we suppress the country
index i and use the superscript ∗ to denote the variable at the world level.
Step 1: derive equations (27)-(30) under trade integration
Given the relative sectoral price constant at χt = χ
∗ from period t = 1 on, the market
clearing condition for final good f in country i is V ft (1 + ς
f
t ) = Y
f
t . Combine it with (1)-(2)
qAt+1RM
A
t
qBt+1RM
B
t
=
MAt
µt+1MBt
=
η
1− η
(1 + ςAt+1)
(1 + ςBt+1)
, and
LAt+1
LBt+1
=
η
1− η
(1 + ςAt+1)
(1 + ςBt+1)
(58)
Domestic investment is financed by domestic saving, MAt +M
B
t = wt, and the aggregate labor
supply is constant at LAt+1 + L
B
t+1 = 1. Combine them with equations (58) and (26) to get
(27)-(28). Combine them with (1)-(2), (26) to get (30) as the law of motion for wage.
If χ∗ = 1, µ∗ = (χ∗)
1
α = 1 and the borrowing constraints are slack. The law of motion for
wage wit+1 =
(
R
ρw
i
t
)α
is concave, according to equation (43)-(44).
In the following, we focus on the case of χ∗ < 1 and hence µ∗ = (χ∗)
1
α < 1.
We first derive the condition under which sector B is active, i.e., MBt > 0 or equivalently
ςAt+1 ∈ (−1, 1η − 1). The positive investment in sector B implies rt = qBt+1R, while µt+1 = µ∗ < 1
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implies qAt+1R > q
B
t+1R. The binding borrowing constraints imply ψt = ψ
∗ = 1 − λµ∗ . Combine
the investment demand and supply in sector A with (11) to get
η(1 + ςAt+1)µ
∗
1− η(1 + ςAt+1)(1− µ∗)
wt = M
A
t =
∫ ∞
t
nj,t
ψt
dG(j) =

− 1−θ
θ
t
ψ∗
wt.
wt =
ψ∗
t
F = (ψ∗)
1
1−θ
 µ∗
1
η(1+ςAt+1)
− (1− µ∗)
 θ1−θ F
Plug ςAt+1 =
1
η − 1 into the above equation to get the threshold value wˆT . Then, equation (29)
defines the export-to-domestic-absorption ratio as the piecewise function of wt. Plug it into
equation (30) to get the aggregate efficiency indicator as the function of the wage rate.
Step 2: the shape of the law of motion for wage under trade integration
In the case of χ∗ < 1, µ∗ < 1. For wt > wˆt, according to equation (30), the law of motion
for wage is concave and has the property as specified by equation (43).
In the following, we focus on the interval of wt ∈ (0, wˆt). Let Pt ≡ 11
η(1+ς
i,A
t+1)(1−µ∗)
−1 . For
ς i,At+1 ∈ (−1, 1η − 1], Pt ∈ (0, 1µ∗ − 1]. Let N ≡ θρ(1−θ) . According to equation (30),
Jt ≡ ∂wt+1
∂wt
=
wt+1
wt
[
α+
α(1− θ)
θ
Pt
1 +Pt
]
> 0, (59)
Ht ≡ ∂
2wt+1
∂w2t
=
Jt
wt
(1− α)
[
Pt
N(1 +Pt)
− 1 + Pt
ρN(1 +Pt)2
1
(αN+ (1− α) Pt1+Pt )
]
.
Given θ ∈ (0, 1) and µ∗ = µA, for wt → 0, ς i,At+1 → −1, Pt → 0, Ht < 0; for wt → wˆT ,
ς i,At+1 → 1η − 1, Pt → 1µ∗ − 1, Ht → Jtwt
(1−α)Pt
(1+Pt)N
[
1−µA−N
1−µA +
µA
α
ρN+(1−µA)
]
.
Let N¯ ≡
√
(ρ−1)2+ 4(ρ+µA)
1−µA −(ρ−1)
2ρ (1 − µA). In the interval of wt ∈ (0, wˆT ), the law of motion
for wage is concave-convex if N ∈ (0, N¯) and concave if N ∈ (N¯,∞). Intuitively, the smaller the
wealth inequality θ, the larger the investment distortion, the larger the sectoral price differential,
the stronger the specialization effect, the more likely the law of motion becomes convex.
Step 3: the threshold values for multiple steady states under trade integration
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), the left panel of figure 15 shows that multiple steady states arise under
trade integration for {λ, ψA} in region M2-M1, while the autarkic steady state is unique and
the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) for {λ, ψA} in region UB (US). The right panel
is for the case of θ ∈ (θˆ, α). Figure 6 is a mapping of figure 15 by using equations (50)-(51) to
convert the borders of four regions from the {λ, ψA} space to the {λ, Z} space. In the following,
we characterize the borders of four regions in the left panel of figure 15.
For {λ, ψA} in region US of figure 14, χA = µA = 1. Given χ∗ = χA = 1, the law of motion
for wage is log-linear with the slope ∂ lnwt+1∂ lnwt = α < 1. See the bottom-right panel of figure 7.
Thus, the autarkic steady state is still the unique steady state under free trade.
For {λ, ψA} in region UB of figure 14, χA = µαA < 1. According to the upper panels of figure
7, multiple steady states arise in two cases, given χ∗ = χA < 1.
• Case 1: Free trade destabilizes the autarkic steady state, Jt |wA> 1. Use equation (59) to
get (31). In the boundary case, Jt |wA= 1 gives 1−µA = Nη . Combine it with µA = λ1−ψA
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Figure 15: Multiple Steady States under Free Trade: θ ∈ (0, α)
to get a threshold value
λ˜T2 = (1− ψA)(1− θ
ρη(1− θ)) (60)
which defines the border between region M2 and M1. Combine it with (50) to get,
λ˜T2 ≡ 1
1 + θ(1−θˆ)
θˆ−θ
−
Zρ(1−θ)ηρ(1−θ)−θ
(
1 + θ(1−θˆ)
θˆ−θ
)(1−η)ρ(1−θ)−1
[
1 + θ(1−θˆ)
θˆ−θ (1− η)
]ρ(1−θ)−θ . (61)
• Case 2: The kink point of the law of motion for wage at wt = wˆT lies at the 45◦ line.
wˆT =
(
R
ρ
wˆTµ
η−1
A
)α
, ⇒ ψ
1
1−θ
A F =
(
R
ρ
µη−1A
)ρ
(62)
Combine (62) and (54) with ψH = ψA to get the boundary condition µA =
1
η
−1
η
− 1
1−N−1
.
Combine it with µA =
λ
1−ψA to get a threshold value
λ˜T1 = (1− ψA)
1
η − 1
η−
1
1−N − 1
, (63)
which defines the border between region M1 and UB. Combine it with (50) to get
λ˜T1 ≡ 1
1 + η
− (1−α)θ
α−θ −1
1−η
− Zρ(1−θ)ηρ(1−θ)
1 + η− (1−α)θα−θ − 1
1− η
(1−η)ρ(1−θ)−1 . (64)
Given the model parameters, one can prove that λ˜T2 < λ˜T1 < λ˜A.
Let θˆ ≡ 1
1+ 1
ρη
< α. Region M2 exists iff the horizontal intercept of λ˜T2 is in region (0, 1),
which requires θ < θˆ, while region M1 exists iff the horizontal intercept of λ˜T1 is in region (0, 1),
which requires N < 1 or equivalently θ < α. For θ ∈ (0, θˆ), multiple steady states arise in two
cases, as shown by region M2-M1 in the left panel of figure 15; for θ ∈ (θˆ, α), multiple steady
states arise in the second case, as shown by region M1 in the right panel of figure 15.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. According to the proof of proposition 2, if multiple steady states arise under trade inte-
gration, the law of motion for wage has the concave-convex shape in the interval of wt ∈ (0, wˆT ).
Given χ∗ = χA, the law of motion for wage must intersect with the 45◦ line at the autarkic
steady state. If ∂wt+1∂wt |wA> 1, there must exist a steady state L with wL < wA and
∂wt+1
∂wt
|wL< 1.
Then, the law of motion for wage is convex for wt ∈ (wA, wˆT ) and there cannot exist a steady
state in this interval. For wt > wˆT , the law of motion for wage is concave and there must exist
one and only one steady state in this interval.
If ∂wt+1∂wt |wA< 1, the autarkic steady state must be the steady state with the lowest steady-
state income level. As shown in the proof of proposition 2, multiple steady states may arise if
the kink point at wt = wˆT is above the 45
◦ line. Thus, there exists one and only one steady
state in the interval of wt > wˆT .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose that the world economy is at an asymmetric steady state under trade integration
where χ∗ < 1 and µ∗ ∈ (λ, 1) are determined endogenously.29 Since χ∗ is not necessarily equal
to χA, the autarkic steady state is not necessarily a steady state under free trade, either. Given
χ∗, the law of motion for wage in an individual country is a piecewise function over two intervals,
according to equation (30); it crosses the 45◦ line once at point H with wH > wˆT and twice at
point L and M with wL < wM < wˆT . Let wM denotes the wage at the unstable steady state.
Compare the autarkic steady state versus the unstable steady state under trade integration,
PA ≡ η(1− µA)
1− η(1− µA) , wA =
[
R
ρ
(µA)
η(1 +PA)
]ρ
= ψ
1
1−θ
A
(
PAµA
1− µA
) θ
1−θ
F,
PM ≡ η(1− µ
∗)(1 + ςAM )
1− η(1− µ∗)(1 + ςAM )
, wM =
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η(1 +PM )
]ρ
= (ψ∗)
1
1−θ
(
PMµ
∗
1− µ∗
) θ
1−θ
F,
1 +PM
PNM
=
(
ψ∗
ψA
) 1
ρ(1−θ)
(
1− ψA
1− ψ∗
)1−η 1
η
1
(1− µ∗)N(µ∗)1−NS1−NA
, (65)
where N ≡ θρ(1−θ) and SA ≡ 1 + 1−ηηµA . According to (59), multiple steady states arise if PM >
N
1−N . Meanwhile, ς
A
M <
1
η − 1 or equivalently PM < 1µ∗ − 1. Overall, it gives µ∗ < µ¯∗ ≡ 1−N.
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), figure 16 shows that the world economy has asymmetric steady states under
trade integration for {λ, ψA} in region Div, while it has the unique, symmetric steady state for
{λ, ψA} in region Cov. Figure 8 is a mapping of figure 16 by using equations (50) to convert
the border of the two regions from the {λ, ψA} space to the {λ, Z} space. In the following, we
characterize the border of the two regions in figure 16.
Consider the boundary case where the law of motion for wage is tangent with 45◦ line at
point M, i.e., PM =
N
1−N . Then, equation (65) becomes(
1− λµ∗
ψA
) 1
ρ(1−θ) [
(1− ψA)µ
∗
λ
]1−η 1
η
=
(
1− µ∗
N
)N [ µ∗
1−N
(
1 +
1− η
η
1− ψA
λ
)]1−N
(66)
The procedure to solve the threshold value λ is as follows.
29If χ∗ = µ∗ = 1, the law of motion for wage is concave and specified as equation (43) so that the
world economy must have the symmetric steady state.
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Figure 16: Symmetry Breaking in a World Economy under Trade Integration
• given ψA, input µ∗ ∈ (0, µ¯∗) to get λ < µ∗ satisfying the above equation.
• find the maximum value of λ for each ψA ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. According to equation (34), for λi ∈ [1, λ¯), µiA < 1, implying that the cross-sector
investment is inefficient and the rate of return is higher in sector A than in sector B. Thus,
entrepreneurs borrow to the limit.
According to equation (21), given µit+1 = µ
i
A, the law of motion for wage is log-linear with
the slope
∂ lnwit+1
∂ lnwit
= α < 1 so that there exists a unique steady state with wiA =
(
R
ρ Γ
i
A
)ρ
.
According to equations (21)-(22), the wage rate is wiA =
(
R
ρ Γ
i
A
)α
with
∂wiA
∂µiA
> 0 and the
interest rate is riA = ρ[1 − η + ηµiA] with ∂r
i
A
∂µiA
> 0 in the autarkic steady state. Combine them
with (34) to get µNA > µ
S
A, χ
N
A = (µ
N
A )
η > (µSA)
η = χSA, r
N
A > r
S
A, and w
N
A > w
S
A.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. According to equation (38), ςN,At+1 and ς
S,A
t+1 must have the opposite sign. Combine it
with equation (35) to get ςN,At+1 > 0 > ς
S,A
t+1 and µ
∗
t+1 ∈ (µSA, µNA ), implying that country N
(S) specializes toward sector A (B) and exports final good A (B). According to equation (35),
one can prove that ςN,At+1 ∈ (0, ς¯) and ςS,At+1 ∈ (ς, 0), where ς¯ ≡ 1
η+(1−η)
1
λN
−τ
1
λS
−τ
− 1 < 1η − 1 and
ς ≡ 1
η+(1−η)
1
λS
−τ
1
λN
−τ
− 1 > −1, implying the partial specialization in both countries.
According to equation (36),
∂Γit
∂µ∗t+1
= (µ∗t+1 − µiA)
(1− τλi)η
(µ∗t+1)2−η
, ⇒ sgn
(
∂Γit
∂µ∗t+1
)
= sgn(µ∗t+1 − µiA). (67)
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For country N, µ∗t+1 < µNA implies
∂ΓNt
∂µ∗t+1
< 0. Then, the fall in µNt+1 from µ
N
A to µ
∗
t+1 implies
that ΓNt > Γ
N
A and Y
N
t+1 > Y
N
A under free trade. For country S, µ
∗
t+1 > µ
S
A implies
∂ΓSt
∂µ∗t+1
> 0.
Then, the rise in µSt+1 from µ
S
A to µ
∗
t+1 implies that Γ
S
t > Γ
S
A and Y
S
t+1 > Y
S
A .
∂Γit
∂λi
= τ(µ∗t+1)
η(
1
µ∗t+1
− 1) > 0 (68)
Thus, λN > λS gives ΓNt > Γ
S
t and hence Y
N
T > Y
S
T .
According to lemma 4, λN > λS gives rNA > r
S
A in the autarkic steady state. According to
equation (37), given µ∗t+1, the social rate of return ΥiT = ρ and ς
N,A
T > 0 > ς
S,A
T in the steady
state under free trade jointly imply rNT < r
S
T , .
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Assumption 3 ensures the uniqueness of the autarkic steady state where the borrowing
constraints are binding in each countries. Use equation (21) and (11) to get
lnZ = ln(1− λ
i
µiA
) +
[
1− θ
ρ(1− θ)
]
ln
(
1 +
1− η
ηµiA
)
+ (1− η) lnµiA (69)
∂ lnµiA
∂ lnλi
> 0 ⇔
λi
µiA
1− λi
µiA
+ (1− η) >
[
1− θ
ρ(1− θ)
] 1−η
ηµiA
1 + 1−η
ηµiA
(70)
One can prove that condition (70) holds under assumption 3.
Figure 17 shows that µA is an increasing function of λ as long as {λ, ψA} is to the right of
the dashed curve in region M. Assumption 3 certainly satisfies this condition.
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Figure 17: Financial Development and Steady-State Aggregate Output: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
Under autarky, the markets for final goods clear domestically, V ft = Y
f
t . As both sectors
are active, rt = Rq
B
t+1. According to equations (1)-(2), w
1−α
t+1 (q
A
t+1)
αη(qBt+1)
α(1−η) = 1. Combine
them to get wt+1 =
(
R
rt
µηt+1
)ρ
. Combine it with equation (21) to get equation (22). In the
autarkic steady state, ΥA = ρ and the interest rate is rA = ρ[1−η(1−µA)]. Following the proof
of proposition 1, one can prove that, for {λ, Z} in region US of figure 3, ∂µA∂λ > 0 and hence,
∂χA
∂λ > 0 and
∂rA
∂λ > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let ψ∗ ≡ 1 − λµ∗ and ψ¯ ≡ 1 − λ. In the case of full specialization in sector A, combine
ςAt+1 =
1
η −1 with equation (27), (11), and the investment demand and supply in sector A to get
wt = M
i,A
t =
∫ ∞
t
nj,t
ψt
dG(j) =

− 1−θ
θ
t
ψt
wt, ψt =
(wt
F
)1−θ
. (71)
According to equation (29), if wt < wˆT , the country does not fully specialize in sector A and
the positive investment in sector B ensures rt = q
B
t+1R. Given µt+1 = µ
∗, ψt = ψ∗ ≡ 1− λµ∗ .
If wt > wˆT , the country fully specializes in sector A and the zero investment in sector B
ensures rt > q
B
t+1R. In this case, ψt > ψ
∗ and, according to equation (40), the interest rate rises
in aggregate income iff ψit > ψ˜T ≡ 11+ 1−θ
1−α
. For wt > w¯T or equivalently ψt > ψ¯, the borrowing
constraints are slack µt+1 = 1 so that the interest rate declines in aggregate income.
wˆT , w˜T , and w¯T are converted respectively from ψ
∗, ψ˜T , and ψ¯ by using equation (71).
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Let us first characterize λ˜TS . Technically, given µ
∗ = µA, if λ = λ˜TS ,
wH = w¯T , ⇔
(
R
ρ
µη−1A
)ρ
= (1− λ) 11−θF (72)
Under autarky, for {λ, ψA} in region UB of figure 14, the steady-state wage rate satisfies
wA =
R
ρ
µη−1A
η
(
1 + 1−ηηµA
)
ρ = ψ 11−θA (1 + 1− ηηµA
)− θ
1−θ
F. (73)
Combine the two equations to get
ψAη
ρ(1−θ)
(
1 +
1− η
η
1− ψA
λ
)ρ(1−θ)−θ
= 1− λ, (74)
which defines λ˜TS as a function of ψA. The dashed curve in figure 18 shows λ˜TS .
Let us then characterize λ˜TH . Consider first the high-income, stable steady state H. Ac-
cording to equation (71), wH =
(
R
ρ µ
η−1
A
)ρ
= ψ
1
1−θ
H F. Combine it with equation (73) to get
ψH = ψAη
ρ(1−θ)
(
1 + 1−ηη
1−ψA
λ
)ρ(1−θ)−θ
.
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Figure 18: Interest Rate Patterns in Stable Steady States under Free Trade: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
Consider then the low-income, stable steady state L and the autarkic steady state A.
PL ≡ 1− µ
∗
ψ∗µ∗

− 1−θ
θ
L =
η(1− µ∗)(1 + ςAL )
1− η(1− µ∗)(1 + ςAL )
, (75)
PA ≡ 1− µA
ψAµA

− 1−θ
θ
A =
η(1− µA)
1− η(1− µA) , (76)
wA =
[
R
ρ
(µA)
η(1 +PA)
]ρ
= ψ
1
1−θ
A
(
PAµA
1− µA
) θ
1−θ
F (77)
wL =
[
R
ρ
(µ∗)η(1 +PL)
]ρ
= (ψ∗)
1
1−θ
(
PLµ
∗
1− µ∗
) θ
1−θ
F (78)
for µ∗ = µA,
1 +PL
1 +PA
=
(
PL
PA
)N
, N ≡ θ
ρ(1− θ) (79)
1− η(1− µA)
1− η(1− µA)(1 + ςAL )
=
(
(1 + ςAL )[1− η(1− µA)]
1− η(1− µA)(1 + ςAL )
)N
(80)
1− η(1− µA) = (1 + ςAL )
N
1−N − η(1− µA)(1 + ςAL )
1
1−N . (81)
Thus, ςAL ∈ (−1, 0) is a function of µA.
If λ = λ˜TH , the interest rate equalizes in the two stable steady states,
rL = ρ[1− η(1− µ∗)(1 + ςAL )] =
ρ
1 +PL
= rH =
λ
1− ψH ρ, (82)
λ(1 +PL) = 1− ψAηρ(1−θ)
(
1 +
1− η
ηµA
)ρ(1−θ)−θ
. (83)
Then, given ψA, find {λ, µA,PL} to satisfy equations (83)-(84).
µA ≡ λ
1− ψA , (1 +PL)[1− η(1− µA)] =
(
PL
1− η(1− µA)
η(1− µA)
) θ
ρ(1−θ)
, (84)
which defines λ˜TH as a function of ψA. The solid curve in figure 18 shows λ˜TH .
Figure 10 is a mapping of figure 18 by using equations (50) to convert the three curves from
the {λ, ψA} space to the {λ, Z} space.
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B The Choice of Numeraire
Introducing composite goods in our model is purely for analytical simplicity and the choice of
numeraire does not matter for our results. In this section, we prove the analytical equivalence
of the equilibrium allocations in setting C where the composite good is introduced and chosen
as the numeraire versus in setting A where good A is chosen as the numeraire. The choice of
numeraire only affects the prices, with no impacts on the quantities, the relative prices, or the
ratios in the model economy. Let Xt and Xˆt denote the prices in setting C and A, respectively.
The analysis in our paper is conducted in setting C. In the following, we derive the autarkic
allocation in setting A and the country index is suppressed.
Agents have the identical Cobb-Douglas preference over good A and B when old. To be
specific, agent j born in period t− 1 spends its entire net wealth in period t to maximize
Uj,t−1 =
(
cAj,t
η
)η (
cBj,t
1− η
)1−η
.
A fraction η of its spending is devoted to good A, which is taken as the numeraire. Let pˆft
and Pˆt denote the price of good f ∈ {A,B} and the aggregate price index, respectively. Thus,
pˆAt = 1 holds by definition and the aggregate price index is
Pˆt = (pˆ
A
t )
η(pˆBt )
1−η = (pˆBt )
1−η. (85)
Following the assumption of Antras and Caballero (2009), an investment good that combines
good A and B according to the utility aggregator is converted into sector-specific physical capital,
Kft+1 = RM
f
t . The cost minimization implies that the price of the investment good is Pˆt.
Since good A and B are produced from capital and labor in the Cobb-Douglas fashion and
they enter into consumption and investment with the Cobb-Douglas aggregator, we get
Yˆt =
Y At
η
=
pˆBt Y
B
t
1− η =
wˆtL
1− α =
wˆtL
A
t
(1− α)η =
wˆtL
B
t
(1− α)(1− η) =
qˆAt RM
A
t−1
αη
=
qˆBt RM
B
t−1
α(1− η) , (86)
wˆ1−αt (qˆ
A
t )
αη(qˆBt )
α(1−η) = Pˆt, (87)
where qˆft denotes the MRK in sector f ∈ {A,B} and µt ≡ qˆ
B
t
qˆAt
denotes the relative sectoral
MRK. Due to the frictionless labor market and perfect cross-sector labor mobility, the sectoral
labor allocation is efficient, LAt = ηL and L
B
t = (1− η)L, according to the sectoral share in the
Cobb-Douglas aggregator. As the investment in sector A is subject to the MIR and financial
frictions, the sectoral investment may not be efficient. Under autarky, domestic investment is
financed by domestic saving. Combine it with (86),
MAt +M
A
t =
wˆtL
Pˆt
, ⇒ MAt =
µt+1
wˆt
Pˆt
1− η(1− µt+1)ηL and M
B
t =
wˆt
Pˆt
1− η(1− µt+1)(1− η)L, (88)
Use equations (1) and (86)-(88) to get
pˆBt+1 =
1− η
η
Y At+1
Y Bt+1
=
1− η
η
LAt+1
1−α
LBt+1
1−α
(
MAt
LAt+1
R
ρ
)α
(
MBt
LBt+1
R
ρ
)α = µαt+1. (89)
The law of motion for wage is
wˆt+1
LAt+1
1− α = Y
A
t+1 =
LAt+1
1− α
(
RMAt
ρLAt+1
)α
, ⇒ wˆt+1 =
(
R
ρ
µt+1
1− η(1− µt+1)
wˆt
Pˆt
)α
. (90)
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Households have two options to save the labor income over time. They can lend one unit of
funds in period t and get the gross interest payment rt in period t+ 1. Alternatively, they can
spend one unit of funds to form R
Pˆt
unit of physical capital in sector B and get the investment
revenue
RqˆBt+1
Pˆt
in period t+ 1. The no-arbitrage condition gives
rˆt =
RqˆBt+1
Pˆt
. (91)
Entrepreneurs can spend one units of funds in period t to form R
Pˆt
units of capital in sector A
and get the investment revenue
qˆAt+1R
Pˆt
in period t + 1. In period t, they can borrow against a
fraction of the present value of investment revenue, λ
qˆAt+1R
rˆtPˆt
, and use own funds to cover the gap.
Let ψt denote the leverage ratio. If qˆ
B
t+1 < qˆ
A
t+1, the borrowing constraints are binding and
ψt = 1− λ
qˆAt+1R
rˆtPˆt
= 1− λ
µt+1
. (92)
The individual’s investment size in sector A must be no less than m units of investment
goods. The cutoff value t is associated with the agents who meet the MIR at the margin,
wˆt(1− θ)t
ψt
= mPˆt (93)
In terms of aggregate investment in sector A, the supply is equal to the demand,
wˆtL
ψt

− 1−θ
θ
t = PˆtM
A
t =
ηµt+1
1− η(1− µt+1) wˆtL, ⇒ 
− 1−θ
θ
t =
ψtηµt+1
1− η(1− µt+1) (94)
The social rate of return is by definition
Υˆt =
qˆAt+1K
A
t+1 + qˆ
B
t+1K
B
t+1
Pˆt(MAt +M
B
t )
= ρ
wˆt+1L
wˆtL
(95)
Since the sectoral production function is Cobb-Douglas and goods enter into consumption and
investment in the Cobb-Douglas fashion,
Combine equations (85), (87), and (89)-(91) to get
rˆt =
RqˆBt+1
Pˆt
=
Rµt+1wˆt+1
R
ρ
µt+1
1−η(1−µt+1) wˆt
= ρ
wˆt+1
wˆt
[1− η(1− µt+1)]. (96)
Under autarky, the aggregate dynamics are characterized by {wˆt, pˆBt , Pˆt, Υˆt, rˆt, ψt, t, µt} satis-
fying equations (85), (89), (90), (92)-(95), and (96).
Let us compare the equilibrium conditions in the two settings. As the choice of numeraire
does not affect the ratios, equations (92) and (94) in setting A are identical as (19) and (20) in
setting C. Since the price of good B in setting A is by definition equal to the relative sectoral
price in setting C, pˆBt = χt, equation (89) is identical as (22). Convert the wage rate from
setting A to setting C wt =
wˆt
Pˆt
and combine it with (85)-(90) to get the law of motion for wage
in setting C,
wˆt+1 = wt+1Pˆt+1 =
[
R
ρL
µt+1
1− η(1− µt+1)
wˆt
Pˆt
]α
, ⇒ wt+1 =
[
R
ρL
µηt+1
1− η(1− µt+1)wt
]α
,
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which is identical as (21). Similarly, equations (95) and (96) can be converted into setting C as
Υt = ρ
wˆt+1
Pˆt+1
L
wˆt
Pˆt
L
= ρ
wt+1
wt
, and rt =
Rµt+1
wˆt+1
Pˆt+1
R
ρ
µt+1
1−η(1−µt+1)
wˆt
Pˆt
= ρ
wt+1
wt
[1− η(1− µt+1)],
which is identical as (18) and (22), respectively.
In the two settings, since the equilibrium conditions are equivalent, the dynamic and stability
properties of the model characterized in the {λ, Z} space are also the same. one can use the law
of motion for wage to analyze the model properties, as shown in the proof of proposition 1.
In setting C, the law of motion for wage is characterized by (21), where µt+1 is an increasing
function of wt implicitly defined as below,
wt =
ψ
1
1−θ
t[
1−η
ηµt+1
+ 1
] θ
1−θ
F =
(
1− λµt+1
) 1
1−θ
(
1−η
ηµt+1
+ 1
) θ
1−θ
F, and
∂µt+1
∂wt
> 0. (97)
In setting A, combine equations (90), (92)-(94) to get
wˆ
1
α
t =
(
1− λµt
1−η
ηµt
+ 1
) 1
1−θ
R
ρLη
F and wˆt =
(
1− λµt+1
) 1
1−θ
(
1−η
ηµt+1
+ 1
) θ
1−θ
µ
α(1−η)
t F, (98)
where ∂µt∂wˆt > 0 and
∂µt+1
∂wˆt
> 0. Then, the law of motion for wage can be reformulated as
wˆt+1 =
(
R
ρ
µt+1
1− η(1− µt+1)
wˆt
µ
α(1−η)
t
)α
, (99)
where µt and µt+1 are the increasing functions of wˆt implicitly defined by equations (98).
When analyzing the law of motion for wage, one only needs to keep track of µt+1 as the
functions of wt in setting C, while one has to keep track of both µt and µt+1 as the functions
of wt in setting A. Thus, the analysis is simpler in setting C than in setting A and hence, the
analysis in our paper is conducted in setting C.
Due to the endogenous extensive margin of sectoral investment, the relative sectoral MRK is
time-varying in our model, which essentially makes the analysis in setting A more complicated
than in setting C. In Antras and Caballero (2009), as the extensive margin of sectoral investment
is mute, the relative sectoral price is constant under autarky χt = χA and so is the relative
sectoral MRK µt = µA. Thus, the choice of numeraire does not matter for the analysis at all.
C Financial Integration and Income Divergence
Similar as in the scenario of trade integration, the extensive margin is the key channel through
which aggregate income becomes a determinant of “comparative advantage” for intertemporal
trade and through which financial integration leads to income divergence.
C.1 Extensive-Margin Effect and Comparative Advantage
In this subsection, we analyze the interest response to income changes under autarky. For
notational simplicity, we suppress the country index .
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If the sectoral investment is efficient, µt+1 = 1 and the interest rate coincides with the social
rate of return. According to equations (18) and (21)-(22), the higher the aggregate income, the
higher the aggregate saving and investment, the lower the social rate of return and the interest
rate, due to the decreasing MRK effect.
If the sectoral investment is inefficient, µt+1 < 1 and the binding borrowing constraints
implies that the aggregate credit demand is inefficiently low. Thus, the interest rate is below
the social rate of return. Combining the binding borrowing constraints with equations (4), (14),
and (20), the aggregate credit demand and supply are,
Dt =λ
qAt+1R
rt
MAt = (1− ψt)

− 1−θ
θ
t wt
ψt
=
τ1−θt wt
rt
λqAt+1R
− 1 , (100)
lnDt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ (1− θ) ln τt︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive-margin effect
− ln[ rt
λqAt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
leverage effect
−1] (101)
St =wt(1− −
1−θ
θ
t )−M i,Bt = wt
[
1− τ1−θt −
1− η
1− η + ηµt+1
]
,
∂St
∂rt
> 0, (102)
lnSt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ ln[ 1− τ1−θt︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive-margin effect
− 1− η
1− η + η rt
qAt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
investment-demand effect
]. (103)
According to (100), the credit demand curve is downward-sloping, because a rise in the interest
rate reduces the present value of entrepreneurial pledgeable investment return; according to
(102), the credit supply curve is upward-sloping, because a rise in the interest rate induces
households to lend more by investing less in sector B. Besides, other factors also affect the
credit market.
• The net-wealth effect: the higher the aggregate income, the higher the individual labor
income and net wealth, the higher the credit demand and the credit supply.
• The extensive-margin effect: the larger the mass of entrepreneurs τt, the higher the credit
demand; the smaller the mass of households 1 − τt, the lower the total household saving
and the credit supply.
• The leverage effect: the lower the λ and/or the qAt+1R, the lower the pledgeable value of
entrepreneurial investment return, the lower the credit demand.
• The investment-demand effect: the lower the qAt+1R, the lower the rental rate of capital in
sector A, the higher the investment demand in sector A, the lower the investment demand
in sector B, the lower the investment of households, the higher the credit supply.
A marginal rise in aggregate income raises the individual labor income, which affects the credit
demand in three ways. First, due to the net wealth effect, the credit demand curve shifts to the
right. Second, the rise in the individual labor income allows more agents to meet the MIR and
become entrepreneurs and, due to the extensive-margin effect, the credit demand curve shifts
further to the right. Third, the rise in the investment reduces the MRK in sector A and, due to
the leverage effect, the credit demand curve shifts backwards. Meanwhile, the higher individual
labor income affects the credit supply in three ways. First, due to the net wealth effect, the
credit supply curve shifts to the right. Second, the decline in the mass of households shifts the
credit demand curve shifts backwards, due to the extensive-margin effect. Third, the decline
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in the MRK in sector A affects the sectoral investment demand and, due to the investment-
demand effect, the credit supply curve shifts to the right. The credit demand and the credit
supply jointly determine the interest rate. Combine equations (101) and (103) to get
(1− θ) ln τt︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive-margin effect
− ln[ rt
λqAt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
leverage effect
−1] = ln[ 1− τ1−θt︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive-margin effect
− 1− η
1− η + η rt
qAt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
investment-demand effect
].
The net-wealth effects cancel out. The extensive-margin effects tend to raise while the leverage
effect and the investment-demand effect tend to reduce the interest rate.
The interest rate response to income changes depends critically on wealth inequality and
financial development. The lower the θ, the smaller the dispersion of wealth distribution, the
smaller the mass of entrepreneurs, the more sensitive the mass of entrepreneurs to income
changes, the stronger the extensive-margin effect. The lower the λ, the tighter the borrowing
constraints, the smaller the mass of entrepreneurs, the more sensitive the mass of entrepreneurs
to income changes, the stronger the extensive-margin effect. Overall, the interest rate rises in
aggregate income if the extensive-margin effects dominates the other two effects.
Lemma 8. Let θ˜ ≡ 1+
1
ρ
1+ 1
ρη
, λ
′
A ≡ 1− 1η+(1−θ)(1+ρη) , and wˆA ≡ (1−λ)
1
1−θ η
θ
1−θF. Given θ ∈ (0, θ˜)
and λ ∈ (0, λ′A), there is a threshold value w˜A such that the interest rate rises in aggregate
income for wt ∈ (w˜A, wˆA) and declines in aggregate income for wt ∈ (0, w˜A)
⋃
(wˆA,∞).
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Figure 19: The Interest Rate Pattern under Autarky
The left panel of figure 19 shows λ
′
A as a function of θ in the {λ, θ} space. Given θ ∈ (0, θ˜),
the right panel shows wˆA as the border of region SD and w˜A as the border between region BI
and BD in the {λ,wt} space. Let us consider the case of λ ∈ (0, λ′A) in the right panel.
1) Suppose that the country is initially in region SD where aggregate income and/or the level
of financial development is high, wt > wˆA. Many agents can meet the MIR so that the sectoral
investment is efficient and the borrowing constraints are slack. The interest rate is equal to the
social rate of return and declines in aggregate income, due to the decreasing MRK effect.
2) Suppose that the country is initially in region BI where aggregate income are moderate and
the level of financial development is low, wt ∈ (w˜A, wˆA). The mass of entrepreneurs is below
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the efficient level so that the sectoral investment is inefficient and the borrowing constraints are
binding. Since the cross-sectoral distortion is moderate, a marginal rise in aggregate income
only triggers small cross-sector investment reallocation and hence, the MRK in sector A declines
only moderately. The leverage effect and the investment-demand effect are weak and dominated
by the extensive-margin effect so that the interest rate increases in aggregate income.
3) Suppose that the country is initially in region BD where aggregate income and the level of
financial development are low, wt < w˜A. Since very few agents can meet the MIR and invest in
sector A, the sectoral investment is highly inefficient and the borrowing constraints are binding.
A marginal rise in aggregate income triggers large cross-sector investment reallocation and hence,
the MRK in sector A declines significantly. Then, the leverage effect and the investment-demand
effect dominate the extensive-margin effect so that the interest rate declines in aggregate income.
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Figure 20: The Interest Rate Pattern at the Autarkic Steady State: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
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Figure 21: Interest Rate Responses to Income Changes: θ ∈ (0, θˆ) and λ ∈ (λA, λ′A)
Let us focus on the interest rate pattern around the autarkic steady state. Figure 20 shows
three cases in the {λ, Z} space. Let us focus on region BI where both λ and R are moderate.
By the same logic as mentioned above, the sectoral investment is moderately inefficient, the
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borrowing constraints are binding, aggregate income is moderate at the autarkic steady state.
According to the middle panel of figure 21, the interest rate is below the social rate of return
and increases in aggregate income at the autarkic steady state. In the world economy where
countries are inherently identical and their initial income levels are distributed closely around
the autarkic steady state, the interest rate is higher in the rich than in the poor country. Thus,
aggregate income becomes a determinant of comparative advantage for “intertemporal trade”,
i.e., borrowing and lending.
C.2 Financial Integration and Multiple Steady States
Suppose that country i allows financial integration from period t = 0 on, taking as given
the world interest rate at r∗. Without loss of generality, we assume r∗ = rA, where rA =
ρ(1− η+ ηµA) if the borrowing constraints are binding and rA = ρ if the borrowing constraints
are slack in the autarkic steady state. Under financial integration, the autarkic steady state is
still a steady state, but it may not be stable or unique.
There exists a threshold value w¯F such that for w
i
t > w¯F , the sectoral investment is efficient
µit+1 = 1 and the borrowing constraints are slack, Rq
i,A
t+1 = r
∗, so that the law of motion for
wage is flat at wit+1 =
(
R
r∗
)ρ
; for wit < w¯F , the sectoral investment is efficient µ
i
t+1 < 1 and the
borrowing constraints are binding, Rqi,At+1 > r
∗, and
wit+1 =
[
R(µit+1)
η
r∗
]ρ
. (104)
Under autarky, domestic investment is fully financed by domestic saving,
Ki,At+1+K
i,B
t+1
R = w
i
t
and equation (21) specifies the law of motion for wage, regardless of whether the mass-of-
entrepreneurs constraint is binding or not. Under financial integration, domestic investment
depends on domestic saving and financial capital flows,
Ki,At+1+K
i,B
t+1
R = w
i
t(1 − φit), where φit de-
notes the ratio of financial capital outflows over domestic saving in country i, with negative
values indicating the case of capital inflows. In this case, whether the mass-of-entrepreneurs
constraint is binding matters for the patterns of capital flows and domestic investment, which
then affects the law of motion for wage.
• If the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack, τt < 1, the law of motion for wage in
country i are characterized by equations (104) and (105),
wit =
(
1− λ
µit+1
)[
(µit+1)
1+ηρ ηρ
r∗
(
R
r∗
)ρ]θ
F
1−θ; (105)
• if the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is binding, τt = 1, the law of motion for wage in
country i are characterized by equations (104) and (106),
wit =
(
1− λ
µit+1
)
(µit+1)
1+ηρ ηρ
r∗
(
R
r∗
)ρ
. (106)
According to figures 20 and 21, given the parameter configuration in region BI, the interest
rate rises in aggregate income at the autarkic steady state. In other words, given r∗ = rA,
the autarkic interest rate in country i is higher than the world level in period 0, if Y i0 > YA.
Upon financial integration, country i witnesses financial capital inflows, which raises the size and
improves the composition of domestic investment in period 0. Accordingly, aggregate output
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rises in period 1. The opposite applies to the case of Y i0 < YA. This way, financial capital
flows have the amplification effect on aggregate output and tend to move country i away from
the autarkic steady state. If the amplification effect dominates the decreasing MRK effect,30
financial integration “breaks” the autarkic steady state and leads to multiple steady states.
The size of the amplification effect depends on the interest rate response to income changes
at the autarkic steady state, which then depends on wealth inequality and financial development,
as discussed in subsection C.1.
Proposition 5. Let λF ≡ 1− 1(1+ρη)(1−θ) . Under financial integration, if θ < θˆ and λ ∈ (0, λF ),
multiple steady states may arise for an individual country; otherwise, the autarkic steady state
is still the unique, stable steady state.
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Figure 22: Multiple Steady States under Financial Integration
The left panel of figure 22 shows proposition 5 in the {λ, θ} space and the solid curve between
region U and M shows λF as the function of θ. Under financial integration, multiple steady
states may arise for parameters in region M, while the autarkic steady state is still the unique
steady state for parameters in region U. To be specific, given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), the right panel of figure
22 shows that multiple steady states arise for the parameter configuration in region MB-M2-MS.
Given r∗ = rA, figure 23 shows the law of motion for wage under financial integration, if the
parameter configuration is respectively in the five regions of the right panel of figure 22.
Let us start with region M2. Given {λ, Z} in region BI of figure 20, country i witnesses
capital inflows and aggregate investment is higher than under autarky in period 0, if Y i0 > YA
upon financial integration. Under a more restrictive condition, i.e., for {λ, Z} in region M2 in
the right panel of figure 22, the amplification effect of capital flows is strong enough to dominate
the decreasing MRK effect so that aggregate output in period 1 is not only higher than otherwise
under autarky but also higher than that in period 0, Y i1 > Y
i
0 > YA. As shown in the upper-left
panel of figure 23, financial integration allows country i to move away from the autarkic steady
state A and converges to a new, stable steady state H with the wage rate wH > wA. If Y
i
0 < Y
i
A,
country i converges to another stable steady state L with the wage rate wL < wA.
30Under autarky, given the parameter configuration in region UB of figure 3, if Y i0 > YA, the decreasing
MRK effect dominates the investment composition effect so that Y it declines over time and converges to
the unique steady state with aggregate income Y it = YA. See the analysis in subsection 2.1.2.
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Figure 23: Laws of Motion for Wage under Financial Integration
For {λ, Z} in region MB in the right panel of figure 22, the interest rate either increases
weakly or even declines in aggregate income. Thus, the decreasing MRK effect always dominates
so that the autarkic steady state is still stable under financial integration. However, according
to the middle and right panels of figure 21, if country i’s initial income is sufficiently large
wi0 > wM , the increase rate rises strongly in aggregate income under autarky. As shown in the
upper-middle panel of figure 23, the amplification effect dominates the decreasing MRK effect
and country i converges to a new steady state H rather than return to the autarkic steady state.
For {λ, Z} in region MS in the right panel of figure 22, the borrowing constraints are slack
at the autarkic steady state with the interest rate at rA = ρ. Under financial integration, the
law of motion for wage is flat at the autarkic steady state, implying that it is still stable under
financial integration. However, according to the left panel of figure 21 and the upper-right panel
of figure 23, if aggregate income is sufficiently low, i.e., wi0 < wM < wA, the interest rate rises in
aggregate income under autarky. Thus, financial integration generates the amplification effect,
which induces country i to converge to a new stable steady state L with wL < wM < wA.
For {λ, Z} in region UB-US, the autarkic steady state is the unique, stable steady state
under financial integration.
C.3 Symmetry Breaking in the World Economy
By the same logic as for the scenario of trade integration, given the parameter configuration in
region M2 of figure 22, the world economy has a unique, symmetric steady state under autarky
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where all countries converge to the same income level YA, while financial integration “breaks”
this symmetric steady state and there exist a continuum of stable asymmetric steady states in
the world economy where a fraction δ ∈ (δ−, δ+) of countries have the income YL < YA and the
rest have the income YH > YA. The proof follows that of Proposition 4 of Matsuyama (2004). If
the asymmetric steady state is stable under financial integration, the world economy is inevitably
polarized into the rich and the poor. It offers a theoretical support for the view that international
capital flow is a mechanism through which rich countries become richer at the expense of poor
countries. Note that the rise of symmetry breaking depends critically on financial development
and wealth inequality. The lower the level of financial development (λ) and the degree of wealth
inequality (θ), the larger the extensive-margin effect, the more strongly the interest rate rises in
aggregate income, the stronger the amplification effect of financial capital flows, the more likely
multiple steady states may arise in an individual country and symmetry breaking takes place
in the world economy. If the integrated countries have the high level of financial development,
financial integration is a convergence force.
Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Let ψ¯ ≡ 1− λ. If the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt < ψ¯. Combine (21)-(22)
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt+1
= (1− α)
[(
1
1−η
ηµt+1
+ 1
+ ρη
)
∂ lnµt+1
∂ lnwt
− 1
]
Combine it with (42) to get the condition for the positive interest rate response to income change
∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt+1
> 0, ⇔ ψ2t − a(1 + b)ψt + ab < 0, where a ≡ 1 +
ηλ
1− η , b ≡
1
(1− θ)(ρη + 1) .
BD
SDBI
ψt
λO
1
1
ψ
ψA
λA
~
'
_
BD
SDBI
ψA
λ
ψA
O
1
1λA
ψ
λA
_
~
'
_
Figure 24: The Interest Rate Pattern under Autarky
Let λ
′
A ≡ 1 − 1η+(1−θ)(1+ρη) and ψ˜A ≡ a
(1+b)−
√
(1+b)2−4b
a
2 . The left panel of figure 24
shows that for {λ, ψt} in region BI, the borrowing constraints are binding and the interest rate
increases in aggregate income, while for {λ, ψt} in region BD (SD), the borrowing constraints
are binding (slack) and the interest rate increases (decreases) in aggregate income. The right
panel of figure 19 is a mapping of the left panel of figure 24 by using µt+1 =
λ
1−ψt , wt = (1−α)Yt
and (42) to convert the borders of three regions from the {λ, ψt} space to the {λ,wt} space.
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The right panel of figure 24 shows the interest rate patterns in the autarkic steady state in
the {λ, ψA} space. Figure 20 is a mapping of the right panel of figure 24 by using equations
(50) to convert ψ˜A and ψ¯ from the {λ, ψA} space into the {λ, Z} space.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. For notational simplicity, we suppress the country
index i and use the superscript ∗ to denote the variable at the world level.
Given r∗ = rA, the world interest rate is r∗ = ρ(1 − η + ηµA), where µA = λ1−ψA (µA = 1)
for the parameter configuration in region UB (US) of figure 3.
Step 1: derive the law of motion for wage under financial integration
Under financial integration, the markets for final goods clear domestically, V ft = Y
f
t . As both
sectors are active, rt = Rq
B
t+1. According to equations (1)-(2), w
1−α
t+1 (q
A
t+1)
αη(qBt+1)
α(1−η) = 1.
Combine them to get equation (104) where µt+1 ∈ (λ, 1].
Let ζt denote the ratio of financial capital outflows and domestic saving, with the negative
value for the case of financial capital inflows. The domestic investment is financed by the
difference of domestic saving and financial capital outflows, MAt + M
B
t = (1 − ζt)wt. The
sectoral investment in period-t and the sectoral labor input in period t+ 1 are
MAt =
(1− ζt)ηµt+1wt
1− η(1− µt+1) and M
B
t =
(1− ζt)(1− η)wt
1− η(1− µt+1) , (107)
LAt+1 = η and L
B
t+1 = 1− η. (108)
Combine (107)-(108) with (1)-(2) to get
wt+1 =
[
R
ρη
µη−1t+1wt
(1− ζt)ηµt+1
1− η + ηµt+1
]α
, ⇒ (1− ζt)ηµt+1
1− η + ηµt+1 =
w
1
α
t+1
R
ρηµ
η−1
t+1wt
. (109)
the equalization of the investment demand and supply in sector A gives
(t)
− 1−θ
θ
ψt
=
(1− ζt)ηµt+1
1− η + ηµt+1 , ψt = 1−
λ
µt+1
. (110)
If the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack τt < 1, t > 1. Then, combine equations (11),
(104), (109), and (110) to get (105). If the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is binding τt = 1,
t = 1. Then, combine t = 1 with equations (104), (109), and (110) to get (106).
Step 2: the shape of the law of motion for wage under financial integration
Use equations (104), (105) and (106) to get
Jt ≡ ∂wt+1
∂wt
=

[
1 +
(ρη+1)(1−θ)− 1
ψt
1
ψt
−1+θ(1+ηρ)
]
wt+1
wt
> 0 if τt < 1;(
1
1
ψtρη
+1
)
wt+1
wt
if τ = 1.
(111)
Let K ≡ θ + 1−ψtψt 11+ηρ > θ.
for τt = 1,
∂ lnψt
∂ lnwt
=
1
1 + ψt1−ψt (1 + ηρ)
∈ (0, 1)
for τt < 1,
∂ lnψt
∂ lnwt
=
1
1 + ψt1−ψt θ(1 + ηρ)
= 1− θ
K
∈ (0, 1)
ln τt =
− ln t
θ
=
lnwt − lnψt − lnF
θ
∂ ln τt
∂ lnwt
=
1
θ
(
1− ∂ lnψt
∂ lnwt
)
> 0
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For wt → 0, ψt → 0 and µt+1 → λ and wt+1 → wt+1, where wt+1 ≡ ληρw¯t+1 is the vertical
intercept of the law of motion for wage and the lower bound for wt+1.
In the following, we characterize the law of motion for wage in two scenarios. Let ψ1 ≡
1− λ
[
1
F
ηρ
r∗
(
R
r∗
)ρ] 11+ηρ
and ψ¯ ≡ 1− λ.
• if ψ1 > ψ¯ or equivalently ρ1−αRα
( η
F
)1−α
< r∗, the law of motion for wage is defined over
two intervals. Let w¯F ≡ (1− λ)F1−θ
{
ηρ
r∗
(
R
r∗
)ρ}θ
.
– For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ¯) and
the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack, τt < 1. The law of motion for wage is
defined by equations (104) and (105).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack and the law of motion for wage is
flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1.
• if ψ1 < ψ¯ or equivalently ρ1−αRα
( η
F
)1−α
> r∗, the law of motion for wage is defined over
three intervals. Let wˆF ≡ Fψ1 and w¯F ≡ (1− λ)ηρr∗
(
R
r∗
)ρ
.
– For wt ∈ (0, wˆF ), τt < 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (0, ψ1) and
the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is slack, τt < 1. The law of motion for wage is
defined by equations (104) and (105).
– For wt ∈ (wˆF , w¯F ), τt = 1 and the borrowing constraints are binding, ψt ∈ (ψ1, ψ¯)
and the mass-of-entrepreneurs constraint is binding, τt = 1. The law of motion for
wage is defined by equations (104) and (106).
– For wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack and the law of motion for wage is
flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1.
Step 3: the threshold values for multiple steady states under financial integration
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Figure 25: Multiple Steady States under Financial Integration: θ ∈ (0, θˆ)
Given θ ∈ (0, θˆ), figure 25 shows that multiple steady states arise under financial integration
for {λ, ψA} in region MB-M2-MS, while the autarkic steady state is unique and the borrowing
constraints are binding (slack) for {λ, ψA} in region UB (US). The right panel of figure 22 is
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a mapping of figure 25 by using equations (50)-(51) to convert the borders between the five
regions from the {λ, ψA} space to the {λ, Z} space.
In the following, we characterize the borders between the five regions of figure 25. Given
r∗ = rA, multiple steady states arise in three cases, as shown in the upper panels of figure 23.
Case 1: In region US of figure 3, the borrowing constraints are slack at the autarkic steady
state with rA = ρ and ψA ∈ (ψ¯, 1]. Given r∗ = rA = ρ, w¯F < wA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
so that the law of
motion for wage is flat at the autarkic steady state Jt |wA= 0. Thus, the autarkic steady state
is still a stable steady state under financial integration. Compare the upper-right and the lower-
right panels of figure 23. Multiple steady states arise if the law of motion for wage is at least
tangent with the 45◦ line at point M where wM < w¯F or equivalently ψM < ψ¯. Use equation
(111) to get ψM =
1
(1+ηρ)(1−θ) . Combine it with (11), (104), and (105) to get a threshold value
ψA satisfying
ψA = ψM
(
1− ψM
λ
)ρη(1−θ)−θ
, (112)
which is shown as the border between region MS and US of figure 25.
Case 2: In region UB of figure 3, the borrowing constraints are binding at the autarkic
steady state with ψA ∈ (0, ψ¯) and rA = ρ(1 − η + ηλ1−ψA ). As shown in the upper-left panel of
figure 23, given r∗ = rA, case M2 arises if the law of motion for wage is at least tangent with
the 45◦ line at the autarkic steady state Jt |wA≥ 1. Use equation (111) to get a threshold value
ψˆF ≡ 1
(1 + ηρ)(1− θ) , (113)
which is shown as the border between region M2 and MB of figure 25.
Case 3: In the region below M2 and US of figure 25, ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}. As Jt |wA< 1, the
autarkic steady state is stable under financial integration.
In step 2, we show that the law of motion for wage has one or two kinks, depending on the
relative size of ψ1 and ψ¯. Given r
∗ = rA = ρ(1 − η + ηµA), financial integration may lead to
multiple steady states in two subcases.
• Case 3.1: for ψ1 > ψ¯, or equivalently ψ
1
1−θ
A η
θ
1−θ <
(
λ
1−ψA
)1+ηρ [
1 + 1−ηη
1−ψA
λ
]
, the law
of motion for wage has a kink at wt = w¯t. Multiple steady states arise if the kink is not
below the 45◦ line, which gives a threshold value of λ as a function of ψA satisfying
(1− λ)
(
λ
1− ψA
)ηρ(1−θ)−θ
= ψA, and ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}. (114)
• Case 3.2: for ψ1 < ψ¯, or equivalently ψ
1
1−θ
A η
θ
1−θ >
(
λ
1−ψA
)1+ηρ [
1 + 1−ηη
1−ψA
λ
]
, the law
of motion for wage has two kinks at wt = wˆF and wt = w¯F . Let µ1 ≡ λ1−ψ1 denote the
value of µt+1 at the first kink point where wt+1 =
(
R
r∗µ
η
1
)ρ
. Multiple steady states arise
if the kink at wt = wˆF is not below the 45
◦ line, which gives a threshold value of λ as an
implicit function of ψA satisfying
(2− ψA + 1− η
µAη
)(1+ηρ)(1−θ)ψA = 1 +
1− η
ηµA
, and ψA < min{ψˆF , ψ¯}. (115)
The border between region MB and UB is defined by (114) and (115).
Region MS-M2-MB exists iff ψˆF < 1 or equivalently λF > 0, which requires θ < θˆ.
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